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ABSTRACT
Noncompete agreements are elements of workers’ contracts that limit the worker’s
job mobility in the event of a job separation. In this dissertation, I address two ma-
jor questions: first, why are noncompete agreements used, especially among workers
earning low wages? Second, what are the ramifications of use of noncompete agree-
ments, both for the firms using them and for the markets in which those firms exist?
In the first chapter, co-authored with Matthew Johnson, I show that low wage workers
sign noncompete agreements when their wages are constrained. I use a novel sam-
ple of owners of hair salons to empirically demonstrate that, when wage constraints
are more binding due to a greater minimum wage or a greater labor supply, non-
compete agreements are used more frequently. I show that use in this context may
not maximize the firm’s joint surplus, suggesting that policy interventions may be
welfare-enhancing. In the second chapter, I generalize the theory of the first chapter,
allowing for intertemporal changes in labor markets. I posit the existence of non-
compete agreement cycles, which may explain recent trends in use among low wage
employees. In a noncompete agreement cycle, workers who separate must exit the
labor market. Low labor supply decreases use of noncompete agreements, allowing
v
labor supply to increase and leading to use of noncompete agreements once again. I
examine the costs and benefits of a policy prohibiting NCAs, analyzing such a pol-
icy’s sensitivity to various parameters. In the final chapter, I consider the e↵ects
of noncompete agreements on the e↵ort exertion of workers. If a worker is able to
exert e↵ort in order to increase the value of an asset, that worker may wish to spin
o↵ a new firm to leverage its value. The worker’s current employer faces a tradeo↵:
a noncompete agreement induces the employee to stay but decreases the employee’s
incentive to exert e↵ort. I show that, when the value of a spino↵ is unknown ex ante,
noncompete agreements may cause large ex post e ciency losses by limiting creation
of highly profitable spino↵s.
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1Chapter 1
Restricting Mobility to Extract Surplus:
Why Low-Wage Workers are Signing
Noncompete Agreements1
1.1 Introduction
When a new worker receives his or her employment contract, it may include a non-
compete agreement (hereafter, NCA), which contractually limits the worker’s ability
to enter into a professional position in competition with his or her employer in the
event of a job separation. Economic theory of the hold-up problem (Grossman and
Hart, 1986) suggests NCAs can potentially enhance e ciency by aligning incentives
to invest in various assets, such as general human capital training, trade secrets, or
client lists. At the same time, NCAs may also impose significant costs on workers by
limiting their ability to pursue outside employment opportunities.
Recent evidence suggests our understanding of the reasons behind–and implica-
tions of–NCA use remains incomplete. For one, while NCAs are most prevalent in
higher-skill, knowledge intensive industries and occupations, they are also frequently
used in many traditionally lower-paying occupations (Starr et al., 2015), even among
fast food workers,2 leading some to question what benefit NCAs could be bringing
1This chapter was written jointly with Matthew S. Johnson (Duke University, Sanford School of
Public Policy).
2Irwin, Neil. “When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete Clause,” The New York
Times, October 14, 2014
2to these employment relationships. Furthermore, use of,3 and litigation over,4 NCAs
have been growing in recent years which, absent corresponding changes in the impor-
tance of training, trade secrets, client lists, or other facets of production technology,
is di cult to rationalize with the theory of the hold-up problem alone. These devel-
opments have captured policymakers’ attention: in Congress, the MOVE5 (Mobility
and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees) and LADDER6 (Limiting the Ability to
Demand Detrimental Employment Restrictions) Acts, introduced on June 4, 2015,
and June 24, 2015, respectively, would prohibit NCAs for workers earning less than
$15 per hour, and bills with similar intents have been introduced by several state
legislatures.7 Both the U.S. Treasury8 and the White House9 released reports in 2016
pertaining to NCAs among low wage workers, and most recently, President Obama
issued a State Call to Action on NCAs.10 Despite this policy interest, little is known
about the e ciency of NCAs in this context, let alone the rationale for their use in
the first place.
In this paper, we show that NCAs arise when employers and employees are limited
in their ability to transfer utility via the wage. When the market-clearing wage
is constrained, NCAs may be used as a tool to transfer additional surplus to the
employer, even if NCAs do not maximize an employer and employee’s joint surplus.
3Greenhouse, Steven. “Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs,” The New
York Times, June 8, 2014
4Simon, Ruth, and Angus Loten. ”When a New Job Leads to a Lawsuit–Litigation Over Non-
compete Clauses is Rising; does Entrepreneurship Su↵er?” Wall Street Journal, Aug 15 2013
5Senate bill S. 1504. Text available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1504/text
6House of Representatives bill H.R.2873. Text available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2873/text
7Some examples include Washington (HB 1926; introduced February 2, 2015), Utah (HB 251;
introduced February 1, 2016), Massachusetts (H.4434; substituted for H.4323 June 27, 2016), and
Illinois (Illinois Freedom to Work Act; goes into e↵ect January 1, 2017)
8Treasury Report: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/
Documents/UST%20Non-competes%20Report.pdf
9https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes report final2.pdf
10Call to Action on NCAs: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
competition/noncompetes-calltoaction-final.pdf
3In fact, such constraints on wages will only a↵ect NCA use if NCAs are not surplus-
maximizing for at least some firms. Thus, we provide a simple method which generates
a su cient condition to determine when NCAs do not maximize surplus: if a change
in the bindingness of a wage constraint a↵ects NCA use, NCAs cause a joint surplus
loss (relative to a contract without an NCA) for at least a subset of the population at
study. We implement this test using data from a survey we conducted of employers
in the hair salon industry.
We start with a simple, perfectly competitive model of the labor market in which
NCAs provide a benefit to the employer and impose a cost on the employee. If
utility is fully transferable between the employer and employee via the wage, NCAs
will be used only when the firm’s net benefit of NCA use is positive: when NCAs
maximize joint surplus. However, when utility transferability via the wage is limited,
the terms of trade in the labor market may dictate that NCAs are used as a tool to
transfer surplus from the employee to the employer, even if NCAs do not maximize
firms’ surplus. NCA use will therefore increase when the terms of trade become more
favorable to the employer or when transferability of utility decreases.
To test the empirical predictions of our model, we surveyed owners of independent
hair salons in April 2015 via the Professional Beauty Association, a trade association
for the industry. The benefits of NCAs are clear in this setting, due to the importance
of client attraction and retention in production, and the prevalence of on-the-job
training. At the same time, due to state-level occupational licensing laws that make
mobility costly, the costs of NCAs to workers are also potentially high. We find NCAs
are widely used: 30% of our sample had their most recently hired stylist sign an NCA,
and 39% have had at least one stylist sign an NCA in the past.
Taking the model to the data, we find strong empirical support that limitations on
transferability of utility via the wage a↵ect NCA use. First, we test the prediction that
4NCA use is higher when the terms of trade in the labor market are more favorable for
the employer. We find that outward shifts in labor supply (proxied by the number of
applicants an owner received for her most recent vacancy), and increases to the local
unemployment rate–both of which will be associated with a lower market-clearing
wage–are associated with higher NCA use. We estimate that one additional applicant
for a vacancy leads to a 4% increase in the probability the hired worker signed an
NCA. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls (including prior NCA use),
and the qualitative result holds for both within- and between-owner variation in the
number of applicants received. We also find that salons in counties that experienced
higher increases in the unemployment rate between 2006 and 2012 (roughly the period
spanning the Great Recession) were more likely to have their most recently hired
worker sign an NCA, even controlling for whether they used NCAs prior to 2006.
Second, we find that increases in the minimum wage, which limit transferability
of utility, also have a strong e↵ect on NCA use. Owners in states with a higher mini-
mum wage for tipped employees are more likely to use NCAs. Because cross-sectional
variation in the minimum wage might be driven by other, unobservable di↵erences
across states, we separately estimate the e↵ect of the minimum wage on NCA use
for salons that hire workers as employees versus those that hire as independent con-
tractors. The latter group is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, and
thus acts as a “placebo group” for the minimum wage. The e↵ect only holds for the
employment-based salons in our sample, and is small and statistically insignificant for
contractor-based salons. Among employment-based salons, a one-dollar increase in
the minimum wage is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in the probability
that an owner has used an NCA in an employment contract.
Combined with the implications of our model, these results imply that NCAs do
not maximize surplus for at least some firms in our sample. However, NCAs may still
5be surplus-maximizing contracts for some firms in our sample. For example, if the
benefits of NCAs are heterogeneous across employers, NCAs may maximize surplus
for those firms with the highest benefit. For policy purposes, it is important to know
if NCAs cause surplus losses across the board, or only for a subset of firms.
To investigate the extent of variation in the benefit of NCAs in our sample, we first
corroborate existing evidence that one benefit of NCAs is to enhance incentives for
employers to invest in production assets, and we then utilize a measure of employers’
ability to invest in production assets originating in the corporate finance literature:
access to a line of credit with a bank (Sufi, 2009). We find strong evidence consistent
with NCAs being surplus-maximizing for employers with high capacity for investment,
but not for those with low capacity. Employers with high capacity use NCAs at a
high rate, regardless of whether the market-clearing wage is likely constrained. On
the other hand, employers without a line of credit are highly unlikely to use NCAs in
an unconstrained environment (proxied by a low minimum wage, low level of labor
supply, or low local unemployment rate), but this likelihood increases as the wage
becomes constrained (via either a high minimum wage, a high level of labor supply,
or a high local unemployment rate).
Overall, our results highlight a potential explanation for the growth of NCAs
among lower-wage occupations and industries in recent years. Between 2007 and
2009, the federal minimum wage rose from $5.15 per hour to $7.25 per hour, and
several states have increased their minimum wage in more recent years.11 Further-
more, in the wake of the Great Recession, there is a consensus that the labor market
has deteriorated dramatically, especially for low-wage workers. Our results imply em-
ployers may have leveraged this weak labor market to use NCAs as a tool to extract
additional surplus from workers over this period, even if workers incurred a high cost
11Historical changes to state-level minimum wages are available from the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion of the Department of Labor (https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm, accessed
December 2016).
6as a result.
At the same time, even within a narrowly defined industry, we find NCAs do
not maximize surplus for some firms, but do for others. This finding stresses the
need for future research to further investigate the benefits NCAs provide to firms,
which can aid policymakers by pinpointing where NCAs are most likely to be surplus-
diminishing, and thus should potentially be banned, as is currently being considered
in multiple U.S. states.
This paper contributes to multiple literatures. First, a growing literature has in-
vestigated the rationale for NCAs and the e↵ects of their use. Using variation in
the enforceability of NCAs across states, an increase in NCA enforceability has been
found to increase firm-sponsored training (Starr, 2015), increase firm shareholder
value (Younge and Marx, 2015), and decrease employee mobility (Marx et al., 2009;
Fallick et al., 2006). Two papers prior to ours use individual-level data on NCA
use: employees who sign NCAs have longer tenure and higher monetary returns to
tenure among a sample of physicians (Lavetti et al., 2016), and among a nationally
representative survey (Starr et al., 2015). Two papers theoretically explore the e↵ects
of liquidity constraints that hinder an employee’s ability to buy out of noncompete
agreements (Rauch and Watson, 2015; Rauch, 2015), finding that such liquidity con-
straints make NCAs lead to ine ciently low levels of entrepreneurship. Finally, in
Chapter 2, I explore the theoretical dynamics of labor markets with limited utility
transferability and NCAs, finding that cycles of NCA use may exist when labor mar-
ket entry is limited. We add to the literature by empirically demonstrating how forces
external to the firm influence the decision to use NCAs in the first place, and by pro-
viding a method to identify the presence of NCAs that do not maximize a firm’s joint
surplus. We also conduct the first survey on NCA use with employer information,
allowing us to explore determinants and e↵ects of NCA use not available through
7worker surveys or variation in enforceability.
This paper also contributes to a literature that addresses the ways in which non-
transferability of utility a↵ects a firm’s internal decisions. A small literature has
empirically investigated the role of the minimum wage on provision of nonwage com-
pensation, such as on-the-job training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2003) and fringe ben-
efits (Simon and Kaestner, 2004). Theoretically, it has been shown that a minimum
wage may reduce ine cient monitoring (Acemoglu and Newman, 2002). We add to
this literature by analyzing how the bindingness of the minimum wage a↵ects the
prevalence of NCAs, which are not only an important aspect of nonwage compensa-
tion but also an organizational feature of the firm. A related branch of the literature
has theoretically investigated how market factors and factors external to the firm
a↵ect the internal organizational structure of firms (such as integration and control
allocation) in the face of nontransferable utility (Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Udry,
1996; Legros and Newman, 2008, 2012). We add to this literature by investigating
the ways in which external labor market characteristics a↵ect internal organizational
decisions of the firm.
Section 1.2 describes the model and its testable implications. Section 1.3 describes
the survey and the resulting dataset. Section 1.4 presents our empirical results, and
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
Our model seeks to address the relationship between labor market conditions, lim-
itations on the transferability of utility, and NCAs. Broadly speaking, our model
yields the insight that, even when NCAs are not surplus-maximizing for an em-
ployer/employee pair, they may be used as a means to transfer surplus to employers
when an employee’s wage may not be decreased to the market-clearing level. This
8scenario will be more likely when terms of trade favor employers (which may occur
when labor is plentiful). We consider the e↵ects of a minimum wage, which may
simultaneously a↵ect transferability of utility (by constraining the market clearing
wage) and the terms of trade (by increasing an employee’s outside option). Finally,
we provide a method to generate a su cient condition for whether NCAs cause a
surplus loss, based on the insight that limitations on the transferability of utility via
the wage from an employee to an employer will not a↵ect surplus-maximizing NCA
use, but may a↵ect NCA use otherwise.
1.2.1 Description of the Model
The model has uncountably many of two types of agents: employers (R) and employ-
ees (E), with associated measures µR and µE. R and E form “firms” in frictionless
labor markets. A firm is comprised of at most one R and one E. When firms are
formed, they engage in production of a consumer good, which sells for an exogenously
determined price, P . A firm containing employer i (called firm i) produces an ex-
ogenously determined quantity,  (i), of the consumer good, which results in value of
production equal to  (i)P . The population distribution of   is  , which has compact
support [ ,  ¯] and no mass points. Employers are denoted Ri, where the index i is
ordered such that  (i) is decreasing in i. Employers have an outside option with value
equal to ⇡R. Employee productivity is assumed to be homogeneous, and employees
have an outside option with value equal to ⇡E. Singleton agents, whether they are
of type R or E, do not produce the consumer good, and receive only their outside
option.
Contracts written by an R and an E consist of two elements: a wage payment
(w) and, possibly, an NCA (A). The wage may be constrained by a monetary trans-
ferability limitation, l, which requires that w   l. The constraint w   l may reflect
the inability of an employer to lower wages due to the need for incentive provision
9(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Arnott et al., 1988), an employee’s borrowing constraints,
fairness concerns (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), turnover reduction (Campbell III and
Kamlani, 1997), employee cooperation (Fehr and Falk, 1999), or a regulated minimum
wage.
If a firm writes a contract with an NCA (A = 1), a positive benefit of B accrues to
R and a positive cost of C is paid by E.12 B may represent many di↵erent elements:
the ability of the employer to make investments in the employee without facing a
hold-up problem, retention of the firm’s client list if the employee quits, or protection
of trade secrets, among others. C may represent the foregone future employment
opportunities of the employee. It may also include the inability of an employee to
leverage a client list or other assets to garner future wage increases, the cost of skewed
incentives due to the NCA (see, for example, Chapter 3), or the delay in compensa-
tion necessary to align the employee’s incentives with the employer’s incentives (e.g.,
if the employer must defer compensation to guarantee that the employee produces
“persistent clients”, as discussed in Grossman and Hart (1986)). Notably, many of
these costs are independent of the labor market characteristics which will be used
empirically in this paper. The limited menu of available contracts follows the incom-
plete contracting literature pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986), and is reflective
of the judicial environment surrounding contracts similar to NCAs, as well as the cost
of writing complex contracts.
R and E are risk neutral. Let Vi(w,A) be the utility function of Ri if she is a
12For simplicity, we present B and C as the gross benefit and cost of an NCA. The qualitative
implications of the model are unchanged if one assumes that B and C are the net benefit and cost
of an NCA, relative to a hypothetical first-best contract. For example, optimal incentive provision
may dictate that the first-best contract has the employee “buy his job” and become the residual
claimant on the firm’s income. If the employee is unable to buy his job due to cash constraints, an
NCA may induce second-best incentive provision by increasing the penalty an employee faces if he
is fired. In this case, the gross benefit of the NCA is the value of the incentives provided relative to
an employment contract in which the employee did not buy his job and has no NCA, and the net
benefit of the NCA is the value of the NCA relative to the first-best contract in which the employee
is able to buy his job.
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member of a firm. Vi(w,A) includes the value of production, the wage payment, and
the benefit gained from use of an NCA:
Vi(w,A) =  (i)P   w + AB
Any R who is not a member of a firm receives their outside option, ⇡R.
The utility function of an E if he is a member of a firm includes the wage payment
and the cost, C, incurred by an E if his contract includes an NCA:
W (w,A) = w   AC
Any E who is not a member of a firm receives his outside option, ⇡E.
An equilibrium is a set of firms and a contract for each firm, {w,A}, such that
all matches are stable (i.e., there does not exist an R and an E who may form a new
firm with a contract that yields strictly greater utility to one member of the pair and
weakly greater utility to the other member of the pair) and contracts are optimal
(i.e., there does not exist a deviation contract for a firm that yields strictly greater
utility to one member of the pair and weakly greater utility to the other member of
the pair).
In the following sections, we first construct labor demand and labor supply curves
by analyzing a firm’s optimal contracting problem. Using those results, we char-
acterize equilibrium contracts. Finally, we generate testable implications based on
comparative statics of the model.
1.2.2 The Firm’s Problem
The wage that an employer is willing to pay an employee depends on whether or not
the contract includes an NCA. The willingness to pay of employer Ri under an optimal
contract may be found by maximizing E’s utility over all possible contracts, subject
11
to satisfying the limited transferability constraint LTC and both agents’ participation
constraints, PCR and PCE:
max
w2R,A2{0,1}
w   AC
w   l (LTC)
 (i)P   w + AB   ⇡R (PCR)
w   AC   ⇡E (PCE)
Consider first a simplified problem which ignores the limited transferability con-
straint, (LTC). Assuming that (PCR) binds but (PCE) does not, substituting (PCR)
into the maximand yields the reduced problem:
max
A2{0,1}
 (i)P + A(B   C)  ⇡R
The solution to this problem is A = 0 whenever B < C, and A = 1 whenever B > C.
In other words, when utility is fully transferable via the wage (i.e., LTC does not
bind), NCAs that maximize the firm’s surplus are optimal, and NCAs that do not
maximize the firm’s surplus are not. The wage allocates the value of production and
the benefit of an NCA to E, net of Ri’s outside option: w =  (i)P + AB   ⇡R. 13
The simplified problem (ignoring (LTC)) when B < C is illustrated in Panel (a) of
Figure 1·1. The optimal contract that satisfies (PCR), { (i)P   ⇡R, 0}, lies on the
frontier without an NCA, since B < C.
Now, consider the full problem with limited transferability, so that the wage cannot
be lower than l. If l >  (i)P ⇡R, the transferability constraint and Ri’s participation
constraint may be satisfied simultaneously only if A = 1, even when NCAs do not
maximize the firm’s surplus (B < C).
13Note that the assumption that (PCE) does not bind is equivalent to  (i)P+A(B C) > ⇡E+⇡R:
if PCE binds, there is no contract that Ri and E both prefer to simply receiving their outside options,
and the maximization problem has no solution.
12
(a) With unlimited transferability of util-
ity, Ri’s participation constraint may be sat-
isfied on the surplus-maximizing frontier.
Here, B < C, so surplus-maximizing con-
tracts do not include NCAs.
(b) With a transferability limitation, the
Pareto frontier includes contracts with
NCAs. A firm may need to use an NCA
in order to satisfy Ri’s participation con-
straint.
Figure 1·1: Pareto frontiers with and without utility transferability
limitations.
The solution to this problem is:
{ (i)P   ⇡R, 0} if B < C and l   (i)P   ⇡R (1.1)
{ (i)P +B   ⇡R, 1} if B > C or l >  (i)P   ⇡R. (1.2)
This problem is illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 1·1. The most favorable contract
for Ri with A = 0, {l, 0}, does not satisfy Ri’s participation constraint. Thus, the
optimal contract that satisfies (PCR) is { (i)P +B   ⇡R, 1}. This contract does not
maximize the firm’s joint surplus: the total surplus generated under this contract
falls short of that generated under the unconstrained optimal contract.
Given values for B, C, and l, Expressions 1.1 and 1.2 represent the inverse labor
demand curve. When B > C, all contracts have A = 1, and the inverse demand curve
(hereafter denoted by D(i)) is D(i) =  (i)P + B   ⇡R. When B < C, the inverse
labor demand curve has a discontinuity at ıˆ(l), given by  (ˆı(l))P   ⇡R = l (the R
that is indi↵erent between the contract {l, 0} and receiving her outside option), which
13
(a) The labor demand curve. The increase
in willingness to pay at ıˆ(l) represents the
benefit, B, associated with NCA use.
(b) The labor supply curve. The increase in
willingness to accept at ıˆ(l) represents the
cost, C, associated with NCA use.
Figure 1·2: Labor demand and labor supply when B < C.
exists whenever     ⇡R < l. For i  ıˆ(l), inverse labor demand is D(i) =  (i)P   ⇡R
with A = 0. For i > ıˆ(l), inverse labor demand is D(i) =  (i)P +B ⇡R with A = 1.
Panel (a) of Figure 1·2 shows the labor demand curve when B < C, taking
into account the limitation on monetary transferability of utility. The increase in
willingness to pay at the discontinuity represents the value of an NCA to the employer,
B.
Labor supply is constructed in an analagous fashion. The relevant maximization
problem is:
max
w2R,A2{0,1}
 (i)P   w + AB
w   l (LTC)
 (i)P   w + AB   ⇡R (PCR)
w   AC   ⇡E (PCE)
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Whenever (PCR) does not bind but (PCE) does, the solution to this problem is:
{⇡E, 0} if B < C and l   (i)P   ⇡R (1.3)
{⇡E + C, 1} if B > C or l >  (i)P   ⇡R (1.4)
The inverse labor supply curve, hereafter denoted by S(i), is given by expressions
1.3 and 1.4. It is a horizontal line when B > C at S(i) = ⇡E +C. When B < C, S(i)
has a discontinuity at ıˆ(l), jumping from S(i) = ⇡E to S(i) = ⇡E + C.
1.2.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
When B > C, all firms will use NCAs, since they are the optimal contract for any
firm, no matter the values of other parameters. Recall that µE and µR denote the
measures of E and R in the labor market. The unconstrained market-clearing wage,
which we denote by wB>C , is determined by the intersection of supply and demand:
wB>C =
⇢
 (µE)P +B   ⇡R if µE < µR and D(µE) > S(µE)
⇡E + C otherwise
If the market-clearing wage is constrained (wB>C < l), then the market contract is
{l, 1}, and there will be a surplus of labor.
When B < C, the contract of the marginal firm in the labor market (hereafter
denoted firm ı¯) will have A = 1 if ı¯ > ıˆ(l): that is, if Rı¯’s willingness to pay lies on
the portion of the labor demand curve for which the firm’s optimal contract includes
an NCA. Indeed, all Ri whose willingness to pay lies on the NCA portion of the labor
demand curve (i.e., ıˆ(l) < i  ı¯) will use NCAs: they prefer their outside option
to the contract {l, 0}, which is the most favorable allowable contract with A = 0.
Denote the market wage in such contracts by w⇤1, which is set by firm ı¯.
Firms whose productivity is high enough that they would be willing to pay a wage
equal to l with no NCA are not precluded from writing contracts without NCAs.
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However, the contract used by the marginal firm sets the market: that contract,
{w⇤1, 1}, yields greater utility to any R than even the most favorable contract for an
R with A = 0 (the contract {l, 0}). Otherwise, {l, 0} would also be optimal for firms
with i > ıˆ(l).
The above logic is summarized in Proposition 1.2.1. We first simplify the analysis
with the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.  P < l + ⇡R (i.e., ıˆ(l) exists)
Assumption 2.  (ˆı(l))P +B   ⇡R > ⇡E + C
The purpose of Assumptions 1 and 2 is to avoid trivial outcomes in which all
firms’ productivity is so high, or the cost of NCA use is so great, that no firms may
optimally form which use NCAs. Assumption 1 says that there are some Ri for whom
a contract with A = 1 would be optimal. Assumption 2 says that, at least for the
firm that is indi↵erent between using A = 0 and A = 1, firm formation with an NCA
yields surplus greater than each agent receiving their outside option14.
Proposition 1.2.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, whenever B < C, all firms’ equi-
librium contracts have A = 0 when there are few E, and A = 1 when there are many
E.
All proofs are contained in Appendix A.4.
Intuitively, Proposition 1.2.1 states that, when transferability is limited and there
are many E in the market, the marginal R is unwilling to hire an E without an NCA.
That firm sets the market, causing NCAs that do not maximize joint surplus to be
the optimal contract for all firms. Put another way, limitations on transferability
14Assumption 2 also guarantees that, whenever B < C, D(i) > S(i) 8i < ıˆ(l): firm formation
yields greater surplus than nonformation for all firms for whom NCAs are not optimal when NCAs
are not surplus-maximizing. This follows from simple algebra:
D(i) =  (i)P   ⇡R >  (ˆı(l))P   ⇡R > ⇡E + C  B > ⇡E = S(i),
where the first inequality follows from the decreasing nature of  (·), the middle immediately follows
from Assumption 2, and the last inequality holds when B < C.
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make NCAs “cheaper” for Rs: the cost of an NCA to an R is the di↵erence in the
wages she must pay for a contract with versus without an NCA. This di↵erence is
less when the transferability limitation increases the wage paid without an NCA.
When µE < µR, we may alternatively interpret the condition which generates
equilibria with A = 1 (i.e., that µE > ıˆ(l)) as  (µE)P   ⇡R < l.15 This condition
states that the willingness to pay of RµE is constrained by l. These two interpretations
correspond directly to the two basic comparative statics described in the next section:
the e↵ects of changes in the terms of trade and changes in utility transferability.
1.2.4 Comparative Statics: Terms of Trade, Utility Transferability, and
the Minimum Wage
Two immediate predictions arise from Proposition 1.2.1. First, increases in labor
supply (µE) may increase the use of NCAs for a given l. When NCAs do not maximize
firms’ surplus (B < C), they will be used only when µE > ıˆ(l). Holding all other
parameters fixed, this inequality is satisfied more easily the larger the value of µE.
This is illustrated in Figure 1·3. An outward shift in labor supply causes the marginal
firm to be one for which NCAs are optimal, resulting in an equilibrium with NCAs.
This result stands in contrast to the environment in which NCAs maximize firms’
surplus (B > C). In that case, shifts in labor supply do not a↵ect NCA use.
Whether contracts have A = 1 in equilibrium is also a function of l, which is clear
from the condition  (µE)P   ⇡R < l. Holding all else equal, a more binding utility
transferability constraint (greater l) may increase the use of NCAs. This result is
illustrated in Figure 1·4. An increased transferability limitation causes the marginal
firm to be one for which NCAs are optimal, resulting in an equilibrium with NCAs
which do not maximize firms’ surplus. Note that, when NCAs do maximize firms’
surplus (B > C), changes in the transferability of utility do not a↵ect NCA use.
15This equivalence is straightforward: since µE > ıˆ(l) and  (·) is decreasing,  (µE)P   ⇡R <
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(a) A shift in labor supply from µE to µ0E
causes the marginal firm to be one for which
NCAs are optimal. The optimal contract
changes from {w⇤0, 0} to {w⇤1, 1}.
Figure 1·3: The e↵ect of a change in labor supply.
(a) When l is low, the marginal firm is one
for whom a contract with no NCA is opti-
mal. The market contract is {w⇤0, 0}.
(b)When l increases to l0, the marginal firm
becomes one for whom a contract with an
NCA is optimal. The market contract is
{w⇤1, 1}.
Figure 1·4: The e↵ect of a change in l.
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These observations are summarized in the following:
Prediction 1. Increases in µE (outward shifts in labor supply) lead to increases in
NCA use when B < C. When B > C, increases in µE have no e↵ect on NCA use.
Prediction 2. Increases in l (the monetary transferability constraint) lead to in-
creases in NCA use when B < C. When B > C, increases in l have no e↵ect on
NCA use.
Corollary 1.2.2. When decreases in monetary transferability of utility or increases
in labor supply lead to increases in NCA use, NCAs do not maximize the firm’s total
surplus (B < C).
One outright constraint on monetary utility transferability is a minimum wage.
An increase in the minimum wage will increase NCA use insofar as it decreases trans-
ferability of utility via the wage, as explained in Prediction 2. However, the minimum
wage may also a↵ect the terms of trade in the market by influencing an E’s outside
option, ⇡E. On the one hand, a greater minimum wage may provide more desirable
alternative employment opportunities (increasing ⇡E); on the other hand, it could
decrease the probability that an individual is able to find a job (decreasing ⇡E). As
changes in ⇡E act similarly to changes in µE, an increase in the minimum wage that
has the e↵ect of raising an employee’s outside option will decrease NCA use via the
outside option channel. Therefore, for any increase in the minimum wage, the over-
all e↵ect on NCA use will depend on the relative magnitudes of its e↵ect on the
transferability and outside option channels. Whenever the impact on transferability
dominates the net impact on an employee’s outside option, NCA use will increase.
Indeed, if a one dollar increase in the minimum wage directly corresponds to a one
dollar increase in the transferability constraint, then as long as an employee’s outside
option does not increase by more than one dollar, NCA use will not decrease, and
may increase. For further discussion of the theoretical e↵ect of the minimum wage
on NCA use, see Appendix A.3.
 (ˆı(l))P   ⇡R = l.
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1.3 Data and Measures
The primary data source for this paper is a survey we conducted of owners of indepen-
dent hair salons in the U.S. in April 2015. We conducted the survey by email via the
Professional Beauty Association (PBA)16, a trade organization of salon professionals.
The survey asked salon owners about various business, employment, compensation,
and hiring practices, their experience using NCAs, as well as various geographic and
demographic details. We also surveyed individual hair stylists separately, but do not
discuss those results in this paper. Individuals who completed the survey were entered
into a ra✏e for one of ten $50 Amazon gift cards.
The PBA emailed its entire email list, with separate links for owners and for
stylists. The email list included 26,827 individuals, and PBA estimates 20% of these
were salon owners. We received 218 completed surveys, resulting in a response rate of
roughly 4% among those receiving an email. However, many of these email addresses
may have been inactive, or otherwise unaware of PBA mailings: only 3,523 individuals
opened the email. If the ratio of salon owners among those opening the email was
identical to the ratio on the email list as a whole, our response rate among those
opening the email would be 218/(3,523*0.20) = 31%. Thus, our “true” response rate
lies between 4% and 31%. While our response rate is uncertain, we do not anticipate
it causes selection that biases our results for a few reasons. First, the survey was
advertised as part of a research study to learn about the use of certain types of
business and hiring practices in the salon industry, and the email did not mention
anything about NCAs explicitly. Second, the response rate was in line with, if not
slightly higher than, prior surveys PBA had sent out to its members on a variety of
topics.17
The model in Section 1.2 made empirical predictions regarding the use of NCAs,
16http://www.probeauty.org
17Private email correspondence by authors with Chelsea MacFarland at PBA on 11/19/2015.
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shifts in labor supply, and the minimum wage. Here we describe our measures for
each of these items.
To measure labor supply, we asked owners for the number of applicants they
received for their most recent vacancy, and whether this number was more, about the
same, or less than they had received for a typical vacancy in the past.
To measure the minimum wage, we use the schedule of each state’s minimum
wage in 2014 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because hair stylists are tipped
employees, we use each state’s minimum hourly cash wage for tipped employees. We
merged this schedule into our survey dataset using each salon’s state.
An additional measure used in our analysis is the local unemployment rate. We
use the annual county-level unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Local Area Unemployment Statistics. We merge this dataset into our survey dataset
using each salon’s county.18
To measure use of NCAs, we asked employers whether their most recently hired
stylist signed an NCA and, if not, whether they have ever had a stylist sign an NCA
in the past. For empirical tests of how shifts in labor supply and the unemployment
rate a↵ect NCA use, we measure NCA use with a dummy equal to one if an owner
used an NCA for its most recently hired stylist, as we do not have a measure of labor
supply for previously hired stylists. For tests of how the minimum wage a↵ects NCA
use, we measure NCA use with a dummy equal to one if an owner has ever used an
NCA, either for its most recently hired stylist or in the past.
We merged in other datasets primarily to include relevant controls in our empirical
specification. We use data from Bishara (2010) to measure each state’s enforceability
of NCAs as of 2009. The measures were created by analyzing case law in each state and
comparing laws based on seven dimensions. Each state is assigned a score from 0-10
18We identified each salon’s county from the zip code the owner reported, using a zip code-county
crosswalk.
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on each of these dimensions, with a higher score indicating stricter enforcement, and
given a composite score based on a weighted sum of the seven scores.19 We normalize
each state’s aggregate score by dividing by the highest (i.e., most enforceable) score
across all 50 states and the District of Columbia, so that the normalized score ranges
from zero to one. We also use each salon’s county to merge in the number of salons
in each respondent’s county in 2012, which comes from the County Business Patterns
database from the Census Bureau.20
Some of our survey questions had small rates of non-response. To deal with
non-responses, we imputed missing values by regressing each variable on the state’s
Bishara score, state’s minimum wage, a dummy for employment-based salons, and
the number of salons in the respondent’s county, and we generated predicted values
for missing responses. We only performed this imputation for potential covariates to
our regression models, and not for our primary regressors of interest (e.g., Number of
Applicants).
Summary statistics are given in Table A.1. Thirty percent of our sample had
their most recently hired stylist sign an NCA, and 39% has ever used one. As a
point of comparison with prior studies, Lavetti et al. (2016) find 45% of a sample
of physicians were currently working under an NCA, Marx (2011) finds 47% of a
sample of engineers had ever signed one, and Starr et al. (2015) found that 18% of
a representative sample of U.S. workers were currently working under, and 38% had
ever signed, an NCA. The average salon in our sample has 7.1 stylists working and
an annual revenue of $379,000. Another important variable is whether the salon is
employment- or contractor-based: 48% of our owners own employment-based salons,
meaning the stylists working are employees (and thus covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act); the remaining 52% are contractor-based salons, meaning the stylists
19See Bishara (2010) for a more thorough description of the data.
20Beauty salons are identified in the County Business Patterns by the NAICS industry code
“812112”.
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that work there are independent contractors. Stylists in such salons typically rent
space from the owner and do not earn wages. Income for contractors comes directly
from the services they provide.
A tabulation of the states in our sample is given in Table A.7
1.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we first set out to test predictions 1 and 2 regarding how labor market
conditions a↵ect NCA use. By Corollary 1.2.2, these results act as a method to
identify the presence of NCAs which do not maximize firms’ surplus in our sample.
We then examine whether NCAs are not surplus-maximizing for our whole sample,
or for only a subset of firms. In Section 1.4.4 we investigate a potential benefit of
NCAs: alleviation of investment hold-up problems. Finally, in Section 1.4.5, we
demonstrate that the e↵ect of labor market conditions on NCA use is moderated by
a measure of the importance of this benefit.
1.4.1 Labor Supply and NCA Use
The first prediction of our model is that, if NCAs which do not maximize joint surplus
exist, outward shifts in labor supply increase the use of NCAs. Table A.2 tests this
prediction.
Columns 1 and 2 investigate the cross-sectional relationship between NCA use
and one measure of labor supply: the number of applicants the owner received for
her most recent position. We run a linear probability model with the dependent
variable equal to 1 if the most recently hired stylist signed an NCA, and we report the
coe cient on the variable equal to the number of applicants the employer received
for the position (#Applicants). Each specification controls for the state’s Bishara
enforceability score. Column 2 adds a vector of additional covariates correlated with
NCA use: the percent of a salon’s stylists hired directly out of school, a dummy for
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employment-based salons, the owner’s age, the number of stylists current working in
the salon, and the number of salons in a respondent’s county.21
Column 1 shows that one additional applicant for a position is associated with
a 1.2 percentage point increase (p < .01) in the probability the hired stylist signed
an NCA.22 The coe cient on the Bishara score shows going from the state with the
lowest to highest NCA enforceability is associated with a 30 percentage point increase
in NCA use, a point estimate very similar to that found in Lavetti et al. (2016). The
coe cient on # Applicants shrinks by a small amount to .97 percentage points, but
remains highly statistically significant, when we add controls in Column 2.
Still, these controls may not capture an unobserved variable that jointly deter-
mines NCA use and the number of applicants an owner gets. If this unobserved
variable is correlated with overall NCA use, not just with most recent hire, we can
capture it by controlling for NCA use prior to the most recent hire. Thus, Column
3 includes a dummy indicating whether an owner ever used NCAs prior to its most
recent hire. As would be expected, its coe cient is large (.59) and highly significant
(p < .01). Even controlling for prior NCA use, the coe cient on # Applicants re-
mains highly significant and decreases in magnitude only slightly (.0082). To put this
magnitude in perspective, the standard deviation of #Applicants in our sample is 9.4,
suggesting a one standard deviation increase in number of applicants received for a
21Because we had many covariates we thought might be relevant to our analysis, we ran the risk
of over-fitting the data by including all of them. Instead, we selected this set of covariates using
an approach involving LASSO outlined in Belloni et al. (2014). LASSO penalizes having too many
parameters in the model, and uses cross-validation to determine the subset of regressors that yields
the best out-of-sample predictions of the dependent variable. We run two LASSO regressions: the
first with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the most recently hired stylist signed an NCA, and the
second with the dependent variable equal to the number of applicants received for the most recent
position, and we keep the union of regressors that are selected in both LASSOs. We also include
the number of salons in the owner’s county as a covariate, which was not selected in this LASSO
procedure, but which we include to ensure that # Applicants can be interpreted as labor supply,
rather than reflecting the size of the beauty industry in the local labor market.
22We obtain results with essentially identical statistical significance using a logit or probit speci-
fication.
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position is associated with a roughly 7.7 percentage point increase in the probability
the stylist that is hired signs an NCA, which is 25% of the sample mean.
Even though the specification in Column 3 arguably controls for the most likely
sources of potential omitted variable bias a↵ecting the coe cient on # Applicants,
it is still possible the correlation between NCA use and applicants could be driven
by an unobserved variable. Thus, Table A.8 investigates the e↵ects of a change in
the number of applicants an owner gets for a position on the change in its use of
NCAs. The dependent variable is now the di↵erence between Last Applicant NCA (a
dummy indicating whether an owner had its most recently hired stylist sign an NCA),
and a dummy indicating whether the owner reported ever using NCAs prior to its
most recent hire. A value of 1 indicates an owner switched from not using to using
NCAs, and vice versa for a value of -1. A value of 0 indicates NCA use remained
constant. Our regressors of interest are two dummies if the salon owner reported that
the number of applicants received for its most recent vacancy was “Fewer than usual”
or “More than usual,” respectively (the omitted category is “About the Same”). Our
prediction is that owners receiving more applicants than usual (i.e., an outward shift
in labor supply) are more likely to switch into NCA use, and vice versa for owners
receiving fewer applicants than usual.
Column 1 of Table A.8 reports results controlling only for the Bishara index.
Owners that received more applicants than usual for their most recent vacancy were
12 percentage points more likely to switch into using NCAs for their most recent
hire, though the result is not statistically significant (p = .20). The inclusion of
additional controls in Column 2 does little to change the estimates. Overall, while
these estimates are not statistically significant, they provide support that changes in
our measure of labor supply also lead to within-owner changes in the use of NCAs.
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1.4.2 The Unemployment Rate and NCA Use
In this section, we test how the local unemployment rate–which models other than our
baseline frictionless supply and demand model predict is correlated with the terms of
trade in the labor market (and therefore, the unconstrained equilibrium wage)–a↵ects
NCA use.
In the frictionless labor market presented in Section 1.2, unemployment only oc-
curs as a result of monetary transferability constraints. However, di↵erent models of
the labor market generate a direct relationship between the unemployment rate and
the wage. For example, in the canonical search model of the labor market introduced
by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), exogenous positive shocks to the separation rate,
the cost of capital, the cost of hiring a worker, or exogenous negative shocks to pro-
duction technology lead to an increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate and a
decrease in the equilibrium wage, yielding a negative relationship between the unem-
ployment rate and the wage. In contrast, exogenous increases in worker bargaining
power or unemployment benefits lead to an increase in both the unemployment rate
and the wage. As a second example, an “implicit contracts” model of the labor mar-
ket (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991) yields a causal negative relationship between the
unemployment rate and wages, regardless of the reason for variation in the unemploy-
ment rate, due to the e↵ect of the unemployment rate on a worker’s reservation wage.
Therefore, as long as variation in the unemployment rate is not driven by shocks to
worker bargaining power or changes to unemployment benefits, both of these models
predict a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the unconstrained
equilibrium wage.
However, if the wage is bound by a transferability constraint, our model predicts
that increases in the unemployment rate, in such cases, may instead be associated
with increases in NCA use among firms for which NCAs do not maximize firms’
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surplus. Therefore, we can use variation in the unemployment rate as an additional
test of the prediction that NCA use is induced by constraints on the wage, as long as
variation in the unemployment rate is not attributed to worker bargaining power or
unemployment benefits a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
To implement the test, we calculate the change in the county-level unemployment
rate between 2006 and 2012 corresponding to the county in which a salon is located.
The period over which this change is calculated roughly spans the Great Recession, a
period in which the national unemployment rate increased from 4.7% to 8.3%. There
is overwhelming evidence that the overall increase in the unemployment rate over
this period, as well as regional variation in the change, were due to factors other
than increases in worker bargaining power or unemployment benefits. County-level
variation in the increase in non-employment over the Great Recession was driven by
factors such as variation in the deterioration in housing net worth (Mian and Sufi,
2014), which points to a demand-level channel akin to a negative shock to production
technology. Additionally, the cost of capital for small business increased in the Great
Recession (Greenstone et al., 2014). Both of these explanations point to factors that
would lead to a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the wage
in a search model of the labor market. We estimate how the change in a county’s
unemployment rate over 2006-2012 led to a change in the likelihood an owner used
NCAs over this same period.
Results are shown in Table A.3. The dependent variable is Last Applicant NCA.
All regressions include the full set of controls used in Column 2 of Table A.2,23 and
standard errors are clustered by county. Column 1 displays the coe cient on the
level of the unemployment rate in 2012. The coe cient is positive but small and
23For simplicity, we use the same set of controls from the variable selection procedure specific to
the regressions involving # Applicants. If we instead use the approach in Belloni et al. (2014) to
separately choose controls for every regression, we obtain essentially identical results to those we
report.
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nowhere near statistically significant. However, cross sectional variation in the local
unemployment rate is very likely driven by many unobserved factors that also might
a↵ect employment contracts. Thus, Column 2 instead uses the change in the county’s
unemployment rate between 2006 and 2012, and the coe cient suggests a 1 percentage
point increase in the change in the local unemployment rate is associated with a 0.041
percentage point increase in the probability that an owner’s most recently hired stylist
signed an NCA (p = .066). However, our goal is to test how the change in the
unemployment rate led to a change in NCA use. Thus, column 3 restricts the sample
to owners who reported being in the beauty industry since at least 2006, and includes
a dummy equal to 1 if she reported using NCAs in 2006 or earlier. The point estimate
and statistical significance on the change in the unemployment rate are essentially
unchanged.
Overall, these results provide further evidence that NCA use increases when the
market-clearing wage is more likely to be bound by monetary utility transferability
constraints.
1.4.3 The Minimum Wage and NCA Use
The second prediction of our model is that–if the cost of an NCA to an employee
is lower than the benefit accruing to his employer–NCA use will be higher when
monetary utility transferability is more limited. If the minimum wage is a binding
transferability constraint, then as long as a one dollar increase in the minimum wage
does not induce an increase in an employee’s outside option that is greater than one
dollar, we expect that NCA use will be higher when the minimum wage is higher.
Table A.4 investigates this relationship. The coe cient of interest is that on
the Minimum Cash Wage, the 2014 state minimum wage excluding tips for tipped
employees. The dependent variable is now equal to 1 if the employer has ever used
an NCA, either for its most recently hired stylist or in the past (Ever Used NCA).
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Note we use this as our dependent variable, rather than Last Applicant NCA, which
we use in our regressions of NCA use on labor supply and the unemployment rate.
Whereas our measure of labor supply (# Applicants) pertained only to an employer’s
most recently hired stylist, the minimum wage a↵ects all hiring decisions, not just
the most recent one. Ever Used NCA is a more stable measure of NCA use than
Last Applicant NCA, which is more idiosyncratic and potentially subject to more
classical measurement error. Furthermore, because most states’ minimum wages for
tipped employees have remained largely unchanged over the last several years, our
prediction regarding the minimum wage is more closely tied to this broader measure
of NCA use. The results we report in this section are all qualitatively very similar
when we use Last Applicant NCA rather than Ever Used NCA. See Table A.9 for
results using Last Applicant NCA.24
Column 1 reports the coe cient on Minimum Cash Wage, controlling only for
the state’s Bishara enforcement score. The coe cient is positive and significant at
the 5 percent level. Column 2 includes the additional controls used in the previous
sections, and the coe cient on Minimum Cash Wage increases in magnitude and is
highly significant (p < .01).25
Cross-sectional variation in the minimum wage might be driven by other unob-
servable di↵erences across states, biasing the coe cient on Minimum Cash Wage.
However, minimum wage laws are only applicable to employment-based salons; inde-
pendent contractors are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. Thus, to the
24All else equal, Ever Used NCA is more likely to be equal to one for older firms and firms with
more employees. However, all of our results using Ever Used NCA as a dependent variable are
unchanged if we control for the number of years the salon has been open and the number of stylists
working at the salon.
25The inclusion of controls increases the coe cient on Minimum Cash Wage primarily due to the
dummy indicating whether a salon is employment-based. That the inclusion of the employment-
based dummy increases the coe cient onMinimum Cash Wage so much suggests these two variables
are negatively correlated, which a simple correlation shows to be the case in our data (correlation
coe cient=-.20).
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extent the minimum wage may bind the market-clearing wage, it could only do so
for employment-based salons, and we can treat contractor-based salons as a “placebo
group.” If we found the minimum wage a↵ected NCA use for contractor-based sa-
lons, we would worry the observed e↵ect of the minimum wage is plagued by omitted
variable bias.
Column 3 includes an interaction term of the Minimum Wage with Emp-based
Salons (the main e↵ect of Emp-based Salons is not shown).26 Thus, the main e↵ect of
Minimum Cash Wage indicates the e↵ect of the minimum wage for contractor-based
salons, and the interaction term indicates its e↵ect for employment-based salons.
Reassuringly, the main e↵ect is small and statistically insignificant (0.032, p = 0.14),
whereas the interaction term is nearly twice as large and significant at the 5 percent
level (0.057, p = .03).
These results strongly support our prediction that the minimum wage a↵ects NCA
use, and they also provide evidence that the observed e↵ect of the minimum wage on
NCA use is not driven by omitted variable bias or sampling error.
Our model yields a slightly more subtle prediction regarding an interaction e↵ect
between the minimum wage and the number of applicants: the higher the minimum
wage, the more likely an outward shift in labor supply results in an equilibrium
wage w⇤0 that falls below l. Similarly, the more that labor supply is shifted out (i.e.,
the higher the number of applicants an owner receives), the more likely an increase
in the minimum wage ends up above w⇤0. Table A.10 tests this prediction. The
dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the most recently hired stylist
signed an NCA. Columns 1 and 2 restrict the sample to employment-based salons.
Column 1 includes both # Applicants and the Minimum Cash Wage, and Column
2 also includes their interaction e↵ect. As can be seen in Column 2, the inclusion
26This regression is a fully interacted model, meaning that Emp-based Salon is also interacted
with the Bishara score and each of the additional controls.
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of the interaction drives the main e↵ects to shrink in magnitude and lose statistical
significance. The interaction term itself is positive, as predicted by our model, but not
statistically significant (p = 0.20). On the other hand, when we restrict the sample
to non-employment based salons (for which there should be no interaction e↵ect of
the minimum wage and labor supply), reassuringly we find an interaction term that
is essentially zero and nowhere near statistically significant (Column 4).
1.4.4 Analyzing the Potential Benefits of NCAs: Enhancing Investment
The empirical findings in Sections 1.4.1, 1.4.3 and 1.4.2 suggest that the charac-
teristics of the labor market–both outright constraints on wages and shifts in the
market-clearing wage–a↵ect NCA use in our sample of independent hair salons. Taken
together with Corollary 1.2.2, these results suggest NCAs do not maximize surplus
(B < C) for at least some of the firms in our sample: if NCAs were surplus maximiz-
ing for all firms, their use would be una↵ected by the minimum wage, and its relation
to the market-clearing wage.
However, our results do not necessarily imply NCAs do not maximize joint surplus
for every firm in our sample. If we relax the assumption that the benefit employers
derive from NCAs (B) is constant across all employers, it is possible B is high enough
for some employers to make NCAs surplus-maximizing contracts. To investigate the
extent to which this is the case, in this section we seek to unpack one potential benefit
of NCAs to employers: in particular, that they enhance incentives for employers to
invest in nonphysical assets. In the section that follows, we test whether the value of
this benefit to an employer moderates the e↵ect of labor market conditions on NCA
use.
One commonly cited potential benefit of NCAs is that, by e↵ectively assigning
control rights to nonphysical assets to the employer, they mitigate hold-up problems
that distort incentives to invest in those assets (Lavetti et al., 2016). For example,
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states with higher NCA enforceability have been shown to have higher rates of firm-
sponsored training (Starr, 2015), and employees signing NCAs are more likely to
receive such training (Starr et al., 2015). If such assets are valuable to production,
the benefits of NCAs could indeed be quite large.
To investigate the importance of this benefit of NCAs in our sample, in our survey
we asked salon owners about their investment in two types of assets essential to
production for hair salons: client attraction and on-the-job training. Regarding client
attraction, we asked owners whether they did any of the following to attract or retain
clients: have a website, have a social media account, give o↵ers on daily deal sites
(e.g., Groupon), maintain a client email list with regular promotions, and/or engage in
some other type of marketing. Regarding training, we asked whether the owner’s salon
provided on-the-job training for newly hired stylists. We run a series of regressions
with the dependent variable equal to one if the owner indicated engaging in each
corresponding type of investment. Our independent variable of interest is the Ever
Used NCA dummy, and we include the Bishara score and our full set of controls from
previous regressions. Because the decisions to make these investments and use NCAs
are made jointly, these regressions should be interpreted as correlations rather than
causal.
The results are shown in Table A.5. Columns 1-5 display results for each of the five
outcomes related to client attraction. The coe cient on Ever Used NCA is positive
for all but one form of client attraction (social media), and is statistically significant
for Deal Sites and nearly so for Email List (p=0.102). These latter two forms of
client attraction are the two that specifically o↵er discounts and promotions, and are
likely the most costly, and thus are most likely the forms most a↵ected by the hold-up
problem.
Column 6 gives the results for on-the-job training. The coe cient of 0.11 (p = .01)
32
on Ever Used NCA suggests salons that use NCAs are 14% more likely to provide
training to new workers relative to the sample mean (.11/.798 = .14).27
These results, while not necessarily causal, support the idea that NCAs can indeed
o↵er significant benefits by improving employers’ incentives to invest in transferable
assets valuable to production. Next, we test whether the extent to which this benefit
is likely to be valuable for an employer moderates the relationship between labor
market conditions and NCA use.
1.4.5 Moderating Role of Employer Liquidity Constraints on NCA Use
The empirical results from the previous section support the premise that one primary
benefit of NCAs to employers is to alleviate hold-up problems that distort investment.
If the value of this benefit is heterogeneous across employers, it is possible that NCAs
maximize surplus for those firms in our sample who value this benefit the most, even
though our findings in Sections 1.4.1, 1.4.3 and 1.4.2 provide evidence they do not
maximize firms’ surplus for at least a portion of our sample. In this section, we
identify a measure that we argue is a proxy for the magnitude of the benefit of an
NCA for an employer, and then we test if this measure moderates the e↵ect of the
labor market on NCA use.
A potentially important source of heterogeneity in the magnitude of B is em-
ployers’ capacity to make investments in transferable assets. An insight from the
corporate finance literature is that financing constraints limit an employer’s ability
to make valuable investments (Fazzari et al., 1988; De Mel et al., 2008). If such
constraints are present, they may result in less potential investment to be “held-up,”
limiting the benefits of NCAs.
27The magnitude of our result on training is strikingly similar to Starr et al. (2015): we find salons
using NCAs are 11 percentage points more likely to o↵er training, relative to a sample mean of 0.8.
(Starr et al., 2015) find workers that have signed an NCA are 7.5 percentage points more likely to
receive training, or 15% of the sample mean of 50%.
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To measure the extent to which an employer is financially constrained from making
investments, we asked employers “Do you have a line of credit or other ongoing
banking relationship you use to finance cash outlays?” Access to lines of credit have
been shown to be a statistically powerful measure of financial constraints (Sufi, 2009).
Such lines of credit alleviate capital market frictions, ensuring funds are available to
firms for valuable investments. If owners with access to a line of credit have higher
capacity for investment, they also likely have more to gain from using NCAs. Indeed,
in Table A.11, we find employers in our sample with access to lines of credit have
statistically significantly higher rates of investment in all forms of client attraction
and worker training. This relationship, while not necessarily causal, is consistent with
lines of credit alleviating constraints that limit ability to make such investments.
This evidence suggests that an employer’s access to a line of credit is a meaningful
proxy for the magnitude of the benefit she reaps from using NCAs. If the benefit of
NCAs to owners with a line of credit is high enough to cause an NCA to maximize
surplus for a firm (B > C), NCAs will be used among such employers independent
of whether or not the unconstrained market-clearing wage is bound by the minimum
wage. Thus, if some employers have a line of credit (and therefore have B > C) and
some employers have no line of credit (and therefore have B < C), all else equal,
owners with a line of credit will a) be more likely to use NCAs, and b) their use will
be less a↵ected by shifts in labor supply and the minimum wage.
Two extreme examples provide intuition on these results. First, consider a labor
market with no minimum wage. Each firm will write a surplus-maximizing contract:
i.e., employers with B > C will have NCAs in their contracts, and employers with
B < C will not. The wage will adjust so that workers are indi↵erent between working
for an employer with and without a line of credit.28 Now, suppose the minimum wage
28A clear empirical prediction of this model is that the wage of an employee with an NCA will
be higher than the wage of an employee without an NCA. This prediction is supported by existing
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is quite high. For an employer with B > C, the minimum wage will not a↵ect her
ability to pay a wage premium associated with NCA use (i.e., for any contract {w, 1}
for a firm with B > C, there does not exist a contract that is a profitable deviation
for both E and R, regardless of the minimum wage). An employer with B < C with
the contract {w, 1} also may not have a profitable deviation contract with A = 0 if l
is large enough: even the most favorable contract for R with A = 0, {l, 0}, may be
worse for R if B > w   l. Therefore, the minimum wage may induce employers with
low benefit to use NCAs while not changing the contracts of employers with high
benefit.
Table A.6 tests these predictions. Columns 1-3 report results examining how
access to credit a↵ects NCA use, and how it moderates the relationship between
NCA use and labor supply. As in Section 1.4.1, the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if the most recently hired stylist signed an NCA, since our measure of labor
supply pertains to the most recently filled vacancy. In all regressions, we control for
the same full set of controls as previous tables. Column 1 shows owners with a line
of credit (Line of Credit) are 15 percentage points more likely to have had their most
recently hired stylist sign an NCA (p=.024). One potential concern is that access to a
line of credit may be picking up a measure of overall business acumen or management
quality of the employer, and not just its ability to access credit for investment. One
piece of evidence this is not a practical concern is the coe cient on Line of Credit
changes very little if we do not include the full set of controls (results not shown).
As a second piece of evidence, if better managed firms also get a higher number of
applicants, then including our # Applicants measure should change the coe cient on
Line of Credit. However, the coe cient on Line of Credit is essentially unchanged
when we control for # Applicants. (Column 2).29
empirical work, such as Lavetti et al. (2016) and Starr et al. (2015), which both find that workers
who have signed NCAs have higher earnings.
29Also note the coe cient on # Applicants, .01, is nearly identical to that obtained in the model in
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Column 3 includes an interaction of Line of Credit with # Applicants. If the
benefit of NCAs for those employers with a banking relationship is large enough such
that B > C, then by Prediction 1, changes in labor supply should have no e↵ect
on their use. The results in Column 3 strongly support this prediction: the main
e↵ect of # Applicants (.017) and its interaction term with Line of Credit (-.016)
completely cancel each other out, meaning that shifts in applicants have no e↵ect on
NCA use among employers with a banking relationship. On the other hand, the main
e↵ect on # Applicants shows that, among employers without a banking relationship,
one additional applicant is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the
probability the hired worker signed an NCA (p < .01).
To visualize these results, Figure A·1 plots the average predicted probabilities that
Last Hire NCA equals 1 if every employer in the sample does vs. does not have a line
of credit, by di↵erent values of number of applicants received. These predicted values
correspond to the model in Column 3 of Table A.6. The average predicted probability
that employers with a line of credit in our sample used an NCA for their most recent
hire is stable at roughly 0.37 no matter the number of applicants received. On the
other hand, the predicted probabilities for employers without a line of credit vary
significantly with the number of applicants. If the number of applicants received is
1 (the 10th percentile in our sample, where the market-clearing wage is least likely
constrained by the minimum wage), the predicted probability is .12. If the number
of applicants is 15 (the 90th percentile, where the market-clearing wage is most likely
constrained by the minimum wage), the predicted probability jumps to .36.
Turning back to Table A.6, Columns 4-5 investigate how access to credit moderates
the relationship between NCA use and the change in the local unemployment rate. In
Column 4, the main e↵ect of Line of Credit holds controlling for the change in the local
which we did not control for Line of Credit (Table A.2, Column 2), which provides further evidence
that # Applicants is a measure of labor market conditions rather than driven by an unobserved
employer-specific factor (at least one correlated with access to a line of credit).
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unemployment rate between 2006-2012. In Column 5, the inclusion of an interaction
between these two variables leads to results remarkably similar to Column 3: the main
e↵ect of the change in the unemployment rate and its interaction with Line of Credit
completely cancel out, suggesting changes in the unemployment rate have no e↵ect on
NCA use among employers with a line of credit. On the other hand, among employers
without a line of credit, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
over the 2006-2012 period is associated with an 8.3 percentage point increase in the
probability the most recently hired worker signed an NCA (p < .01).
Columns 6-8 report results examining how access to credit moderates the rela-
tionship between NCA use and the minimum wage. Now, as in Section 1.4.3, the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the owner has ever used NCAs. Col-
umn 6 shows a coe cient on Line of Credit slightly smaller to Column 1 (when the
dependent variable is a dummy if the most recently hired stylist signed one). The co-
e cient is unchanged controlling for the state’s minimum wage (Column 7). Column
8 includes an interaction of Line of Credit with the minimum wage. The interaction
term, significant at the 5% level (p = .024), suggests the e↵ect of the minimum wage
on the probability of NCA use is 60% smaller for the group of owners with a banking
relationship compared to the group without one (.067-.038=-.029, compared to .067).
A final note about these results is they each consistently show that, when wages are
unconstrained, only those firms for which we expect NCAs to be surplus-maximizing
are likely to use them. The main e↵ects of Line of Credit in Columns 3, 5 and 6 (0.27,
0.44 and 0.31, respectively, all p < .01) each provide an estimate of the di↵erence in
probabilities that owners with high B use NCAs in 3 di↵erent scenarios when the
market-clearing wage is least likely to be constrained. This similarity in the main
e↵ect across these regressions provides further support that our model is capturing
the determinants of NCA use in our sample: regardless of how we proxy for a scenario
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when the market-clearing wage is unconstrained, we get a very similar estimate of
the di↵erence in probabilities that employers with high vs low benefit from NCAs use
them.
These results paint a nuanced portrait of NCA use and surplus maximization
among the firms in our sample. We find strong evidence that constraints on wages in
the labor market have a statistically significant and economically meaningful e↵ect
on NCA use. However, this relationship only exists for the employers in our sample
likely to benefit the least from NCA use. On the other hand, among employers likely
to benefit the most from NCAs, and thus for which NCAs are most likely to maximize
joint surplus, NCAs are both more widely used, and are una↵ected by constraints on
wages. These results suggest NCAs may be surplus-maximizing for some firms in our
sample, but not others.
1.5 Conclusion
Noncompete agreements are part of a large and growing share of employment rela-
tionships in the U.S., and questions about their rationale, e↵ects and e ciency have
made NCAs a controversial topic among policymakers. This paper shows NCAs may
arise for reasons unrelated to their ability to maximize a firm’s surplus–or even despite
the fact that they do not maximize a firm’s surplus. We develop a simple model with
the implication that, when workers and employers are constrained in their ability
to use monetary transfers to equilibrate labor markets, NCAs may arise as a non-
pecuniary tool to transfer surplus from employees to employers. Such constraints can
only a↵ect NCA use if NCAs are not used in an unconstrained world, which they will
not be if the employee’s cost of an NCA exceeds the employer’s benefit (i.e., when
NCAs do not maximize firms’ surplus). Our model generates a method that provides
a su cient condition for existence of NCAs which do not maximize firms’ surplus: if
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the bindingness of transferability constraints a↵ects NCA use (e.g., via changes in the
minimum wage or labor supply), then NCAs which do not maximize firms’ surplus
exist.
Using a new survey of independent salon owners in the beauty industry, we find
strong empirical evidence that constraints on monetary transfers (in the form of the
minimum wage) and variation in forces that are associated with the market-clearing
wage (labor supply and the unemployment rate) have statistically significant and
economically meaningful e↵ects on NCA use. These results support the conclusion
that contracts that cause a surplus loss exist in this labor market, and provide some
of the first evidence that changes to the external labor market a↵ect internal non-
monetary contracting decisions of firms.
We further explore the benefits associated with NCA use by identifying a subset of
firms for which NCAs are likely to have a low private benefit: firms that, due to lack
of access to a line of credit with a bank, are less able to make relevant investments,
such as in client attraction or general human capital training. Due to the low benefit
of NCAs for those firms, NCAs are likely not to maximize joint surplus for them.
Consistent with that hypothesis, we find that NCA use at those firms is most a↵ected
by conditions in the labor market.
One limitation of the test we propose is that it only identifies NCAs which do not
maximize joint surplus at the firm level. It does not necessarily follow that NCAs
identified in this way do not maximize social surplus. For example, if NCAs cause
a surplus loss for a firm, but a minimum wage makes it optimal for employers to
use NCAs, our model predicts the equilibrium quantity of labor employed will be
higher than it would if NCAs were unavailable. However, there are other reasons to
believe NCAs will not maximize social surplus if they do not maximize firms’ surplus.
For example, they may depress levels of entrepreneurship (Rauch and Watson, 2015;
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Samila and Sorenson, 2011) or decrease labor market churn (Marx et al., 2009) which
may limit e cient matching.
From a policy standpoint, our findings o↵er support for bills, such as the MOVE
Act, which would render NCAs signed by low-wage workers unenforceable. Our model
predicts a tradeo↵ from such policies. Employment may decrease if NCAs are not
available to equilibrate labor markets. However, firms that are productive enough to
hire workers with no NCA will use surplus maximizing contracts. If the employment
e↵ects of a minimum wage are small or an NCA’s cost to an employee is much greater
than the benefit to an employer, the overall e↵ect of legal nonenforcement would be
positive, even ignoring any negative externalities. If the employment e↵ects are large
or the cost of an NCA is close to its benefit, policymakers may at least be reassured
that for any firms which continue to hire workers without NCAs, the total surplus of
the firm will increase. This recommendation may be refined by continuing to identify
firms which benefit most from NCA use: for example, those most able to invest in
assets which NCAs may protect.
This paper also highlights a potentially unintended consequence of minimum wage
laws, as our results suggest a higher minimum wage leads to an increased use of NCAs.
Many papers have sought to estimate the e↵ects of the minimum wage on employment
and wages. A smaller literature has investigated the e↵ect of the minimum wage on
non-wage job attributes, such as Acemoglu and Pischke (2003), who find no strong
evidence of an increase or decrease in on-the-job training associated with increases
in the minimum wage, and Simon and Kaestner (2004), who find no evidence that
an increase in the minimum wage leads to a reduction in fringe benefits of low-wage
workers. Our results point to a previously overlooked component of nonwage compen-
sation that employers can adjust in response to minimum wage increases. If we take
as given that minimum wage laws are desirable for equity or welfare reasons (Lang,
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1987; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995), policymakers must be aware of employers’ abilities
to extract surplus from workers in other ways, especially using contract provisions
like NCAs that potentially limit workers’ future employment opportunities.
Future research may seek to estimate the magnitude of the costs and benefits of
NCA use. Although this paper develops a test to determine whether NCAs cause a
surplus loss, the global e ciency of NCA use is left ambiguous, which is an important
factor in policymaking and a promising avenue for future work. Finally, increased
exploration of ways that NCAs benefit firms that employ low-wage employees will
help policy makers identify occupations, industries, or other subsets of the labor
market for whom NCAs are most likely not to maximize surplus. In order to do so,
new data containing more detailed information on NCA use are required.
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Chapter 2
Noncompete Agreements and Labor
Market Dynamics
2.1 Introduction
If an employer adjusts a non-wage amenity (e.g., health insurance, workplace safety,
or pension generosity) of a worker in response to a change in the minimum wage, that
adjustment typically does not have external labor market e↵ects. One exception is an
adjustment to on-the-job training: if an employer adjusts levels of on-the-job training
of her employees when the minimum wage changes (e.g., as hypothesized in Acemoglu
and Pischke (2003)), the levels of human capital accumulation in the labor market as
a whole are a↵ected. Another exception is a change in the use of noncompete agree-
ments (hereafter, NCAs): contractual elements which restrict employee mobility1.
By limiting reentry of currently employed individuals into occupation-specific labor
markets, NCAs may a↵ect labor market composition and relative market power.
A segment of the empirical literature on NCAs has focused on this channel: for
example, mobility in Silicon Valley (Fallick et al., 2006), mobility of workers in Michi-
gan following a reform in NCA laws (Marx et al., 2009), and mobility of technical
workers (Marx, 2011). In the opposite direction, abundant labor has been shown to
increase prevalence of NCAs in the presence of constraints on utility transferability
via the wage, such as the minimum wage (as shown in Chapter 1). This bidirectional
1See Bishara and Starr (2016) for a review of the literature on NCAs.
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causality has implications for labor markets and the welfare of both workers and firms.
In this paper, I construct a model of dynamic labor markets in which NCA use and
labor supply are jointly determined over time.
The basic mechanism of the model is as follows: when the market clearing wage
is constrained (e.g., by a minimum wage or the inability of an employee to borrow
requisite funds to “purchase” his or her job: see, for example, Scheinkman and Weiss
(1986)), an NCA may be used to allocate surplus to an employer by worsening the
bargaining position of her employee in future wage negotiations. Increased preva-
lence of NCAs limits reentry into the labor market for employees that undergo job
separation. If there is a constraint on the ability of new employees to enter the labor
market, labor supply may decrease in periods following high use of NCAs. Low labor
supply may cause the market clearing wage to be locally unconstrained, causing firms
to use adjustments to the wage instead of NCAs to clear the labor market. In the
absence of prevalent NCAs, entry into the labor market (including reentry of sepa-
rated workers not bound by NCAs) dominates exit, and labor supply may eventually
return to its former size, causing the market clearing wage to once again become
constrained. When entry into the market by potential employees is unlimited, the
labor market may achieve a steady state, either with or without NCAs, since flows
out of the market of separated employees with NCAs will be balanced by flows into
the market of new employees.
From a welfare perspective, the enforceability of NCAs poses a tradeo↵ both
socially and from the point of view of employers. Socially, NCAs that are only
used when the market clearing wage is constrained reduce each individual firm’s joint
surplus relative to a contract with no NCAs: if this were not the case, NCAs would be
used universally. But, NCAs may temporarily increase employment levels by allowing
the labor market to clear, and in turn, increase the measure of suppliers in the goods
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market. Many recent policy initiatives have sought to limit NCA use among low-
wage workers2. The results in this paper may inform that discussion from a social
optimality point of view.
To fully explore the interactions summarized above, the model incorporates wage
constraints in a competitive labor market with potentially limited entry by new em-
ployees. Since the measure of firms in the market may change due to entry and exit,
the market for the good produced by firms is also modeled, leading to endogenous
goods prices. Sustained employment generates a surplus which is split between em-
ployers and employees in the absence of a noncompete agreement, and accrues only to
employers when the firm uses a NCA. This structure is a simplification of a bargaining
game played by employers and employees who may be bargaining, for example, over
quasi-rents generated by avoiding paying a hiring cost. Employees’ outside options
are compromised by an NCA, forcing them to yield their portion of the quasi-rent.
The results generated in this paper, however, are not specific to situations in which
NCAs are motivated by hiring costs. NCAs may assign control rights to a client list,
solve a hold-up problem, or protect trade secrets. Critically, in all of these cases
and more, noncompete agreements cause the continuation payo↵ of an employer to
improve while the continuation payo↵ of the employee may improve, worsen, or re-
main the same. Whenever an employer’s continuation payo↵ improves, noncompete
agreements may be used to transfer surplus in the presence of wage constraints. Of
course, the extent to which NCAs increase or decrease the payo↵s of employers and
employees a↵ects the welfare tradeo↵s of society and employers.
This model follows the incomplete contracting literature pioneered by Grossman
and Hart (1986), Hart and Holmstro¨m (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990). NCAs
may be viewed as an imperfect method to allocate future surplus when contingent
2See http://www.natlawreview.com/article/which-states-are-likely-to-enact-laws-restricting-
non-compete-agreements-2017 for a summary of recent or planned legislation at the state level.
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contracting or the wage itself are unable to do so. The model presented here is
similar to the static model presented in Legros and Newman (2008), with changes
implemented to highlight one unique aspect of NCAs as opposed to other contractual
elements: that they dynamically change the structure of the market itself. While no
other papers have focused on labor market dynamics when NCAs are used among
low wage workers, Rauch (2015) and Rauch and Watson (2015) analyze some of the
e↵ects of contracting with NCAs in similar incomplete contracting environments.
In Section 2.2, the model and the definition of equilibrium are introduced. In
Section 2.3, I reduce the properties which hold true in any equilibrium of the model,
solve for labor supply and demand within a given period, and characterize single
period equilibrium, which takes as given future prices, contracts, and measures of
agents. In Section 2.4, I characterize the dynamics of the model, proving the existence
of NCA cycles. In Section 2.5, I analyze when a policy of NCA nonenforcement is
most likely to be socially beneficial. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model has infinite discrete periods, indexed by t. In each period, employees (E)
and employers (R) frictionlessly form “firms” (comprised of one E and one R) in
order to produce a consumer good, which is sold in a competitive market. The items
of primary importance are the single-period contracts in each period for each firm,
{wt, At}, each of which must be agreed to by an E and an R. The wage, wt, is an
uncontingent payment made instantly from R to E which is required to be greater
than l, the wage constraint. The second contractual element, At 2 {0, 1}, represents
an NCA: if At = 1, the employee is bound by an NCA. Upon separation from her
employer, an employee with an NCA is forced out of the labor market. If At = 0, the
employee is free to move to other firms in future periods.
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Within each period, there are three dates. At date 1, preexisting firms may agree
to contracts or separate, and new firms may form. Firms are comprised of one E and
one R. All E not previously bound by an NCA and all R are eligible to form new
firms, including members of a preexisting firm which fails to agree to a contract. In
order to form a new firm at time t, an R/E pair must both accept the market contract,
{wt, At}. If an agent is unable to, or chooses not to, agree to a contract, that agent
receives her outside option for that period, which is equal to ⇧ for E, and normalized
to zero for R. Agents at preexisting firms have three options: they may opt to agree
to the contract {wt+mW , 0} if At 1 = 0 or {wt, 0} if At 1 = 1; they may opt to return
to the open market and agree to the market contract as part of a new firm (except
for E with At 1 = 1); or each may opt to receive her outside option. In other words,
E receives a wage bonus if she remains with her firm, contingent on not having a
noncompete agreement. Though wage negotiation is not explicitly modeled, the lack
of a wage increase with an NCA should be understood as E’s inability to negotiate
a wage increase due to her compromised outside option3. Since the wage payment is
made instantly and without an explicit mechanism to commit to future behaviors, I
implicitly assume that any future action is noncontractible. This assumption reflects
the realistic contracting environment in which it is too costly or complicated to write
contingent contracts planning for all eventualities.
At date 2, each R matched with an E produces exactly one unit of a homogeneous
consumer good at exogenous cost   2 { L,  H}, where a proportion p of R have  L as
their cost, 1 p have  H , and  H >  L. Since E’s wage has already been paid,   is the
3The structure of wage setting for preexisting firms is predicated on rather strong assumptions
made for tractability. A more complicated model in which preexisting firms Nash bargain over a
relationship-specific quasi-rent (perhaps induced by a hiring cost which must be paid by new firms)
via wages in each period generates a similar environment, though. In that setting, the endogenous
wage bonus turns out not to be purely additive, and additional assumptions are required on the size
of the productivity bonus firms accrue in order to ensure that A = F for preexisting firms. However,
the qualitative implications are unchanged in such a model, and the model is far more complicated
to solve.
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marginal cost of production for the firm. The price of the consumer good, Pt, is deter-
mined in a competitive goods market, in which consumers maximize a quasi-concave
utility function, yielding inverse demand function P (Qt), where Qt is the measure of
firms at time t, as each firm produces one unit of the good. Preexisting firms earn an
additional mp, a relationship-specific quasi-rent which may be interpreted, for exam-
ple, as a decrease in the marginal cost of production, as an increase in the price paid
by consumers due to a higher quality product, or as the size of a hiring cost which
need not be paid by preexisting firms.
Finally, at date 3, each E that is a member of a firm exogenously separates from
their matched R with probability s. An exogenous measure of E equal to ⌦, who had
not previously participated in the labor market are allowed to enter the labor market
by paying a cost of c. Each E outside the labor market in period t may only enter
the market in that period, or else receives her outside option in perpetuity–there is
no delayed labor market entry. It is assumed that the total measure of R, µR, is
exogenous and fixed4. Any E with At = 1 that experiences exogenous separation
must exit the labor market, receiving her outside option, ⇧, in all future periods.
2.2.1 Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium is, in each period, a market contract for unmatched agents, a price in
the goods market, participation decisions for all agents (receive their outside option,
form a firm under the market contract, or accept the corresponding contract for
preexisting firms), and entry decisions for employees outside of the market such that
in each period, correctly anticipating future contracts, prices, participation decisions,
and entry decisions:
4The assumption that no additional R may enter the market is relatively benign. Ultimately,
without change in the demand function or the outside options of agents, there is a market size above
which agents will not wish to enter, as the accruable rents in the market sum only to just enough
to cover the entry costs of the agents.
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1. participation decisions are stable/contracts are Pareto optimal: there do not
exist an E and an R and a contract which yields strictly greater discounted
utility to one of the two agents, and discounted utility that is at least as great
for the other member;
2. agents enter the labor market if entry yields discounted expected utility strictly
greater than the expected discounted utility of remaining out of the labor mar-
ket, and agents do not enter the labor market if entry yields discounted expected
utility strictly less than the expected discounted utility of remaining out of the
labor market; and
3. the goods market price clears the goods market.
An equilibrium is a steady state equilibrium if the measure of firms induced by
participation decisions and new market pre-contracts remain constant over time. That
is, 8t and 8t0:
{Qt, wt, At} = {Qt0 , wt0 , At0}
where Qt is the measure of firms in the market in period t induced by entry decisions
and matching.
An equilibrium is a  -cyclical equilibrium if there exists   2 {2, 3, ...} such that
the size of the market and new market contracts repeat every   periods. That is, 8t
and 8n 2 N:
{Qt, wt, At} = {Qt+n , wt+n , At+n }
2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, I characterize equilibrium contracts. In the model, agents take as
given labor market pre-contracts ({wt, At}) and the goods market price (Pt). The
choice variables for each agent are the decision whether or not to enter the labor
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market (for agents not already in the labor market), the decision whether to accept
the market contract or receive her outside option (for unmatched agents), or the
decision whether to accept the corresponding preexisting firm contract, the market
contract, or receive her outside option (for matched agents). The state variables of
the model at the beginning of a given period, t, are the measures of E and R with
At 1 = 0 and At 1 = 1, respectively, which are denoted µFE,t, µ
N
E,t, µ
F
R,t, and µ
N
R,t, and
the measure of unmatched E and R which are denoted µUE,t and µ
U
R,t. Each agent’s
participation status (out of the market, unmatched, matched under a contract with
At 1 = F , or matched under a contract with At 1 = 1) serves as an additional state
variable for that agent.
At time t, given goods market price Pt, production cost  , and contract {w,A}
(if matched), an employer, R, receives a period payo↵ normalized to zero if she is
not a member of a firm, Pt       w if she is a member of a newly formed firm, and
Pt +mp    i   w if she is a member of a preexisting firm. An employee receives ⇧ if
he is not a member of a firm, w if he is, and additionally pays a cost c if he entered
the market in period t.
2.3.1 Definition of Value Functions
Let V Ut ( ) represent the expected discounted value to an unmatched R of being in
the market at the outset of period t. Let V Ft ( ) and V
N
t ( ) be the analagous value
functions for R who were previously matched under contracts with At 1 = 0 or
At 1 = 1. These value functions are given by:
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V Ut ( ) = max
⇢
 V Ut+1( ), Pt       wt
+  
h
sV Ut+1( ) + (1  s)(AtV Nt+1( ) + (1  At)V Ft+1( ))
i 
V Ft ( ) = max
⇢
V Ut ( ), Pt +m
p       wt  mw +  
h
sV Ut+1( ) + (1  s)V Ft+1( )
i 
V Nt ( ) = max
⇢
V Ut ( ), Pt +m
p       wt +  
h
sV Ut+1( ) + (1  s)V Ft+1( ))
i 
An unmatched R has the option of receiving her outside option and waiting until
period t + 1 or joining a new firm in period t. A matched R (with At 1 = F or N ,
respectively) also may wait until period t+1 or join a new firm, but additionally has
the option of remaining with her matched E and using the corresponding time t+ 1
contract.
E has three comparable endogenous value functions, WUt , W
F
t , and W
N
t . They
are given by:
WUt = max
⇢
⇧+  WUt+1, wt +  
h
s(At
⇧
1    + (1  At)W
U
t+1)
+ (1  s)(AtWNt+1 + (1  At)W Ft+1)
i 
W Ft = max
⇢
WUt , wt +m
w +  
h
sWUt+1 + (1  s)W Ft+1
i 
WNt = max
⇢
⇧
1    , wt +  
h
sWUt+1 + (1  s)W Ft+1
i 
Notably, an E with At 1 = N may only be a member of a firm with his matched
R: he does not have the option of reentering the labor market to form a new firm.
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2.3.2 Formal Equilibrium Conditions
The first equilibrium condition states that matches are stable/Pareto optimal for the
firm: @{w˜, A˜} such that one of the following two conditions is satisfied (where   may
be  L or  H , and i may be F or N):
Pt   w˜     +  
h
sV Ut+1( ) + (1  s)(A˜V Nt+1( ) + (1  A˜)V Ft+1( ))
i
  V Ut ( ) (2.1)
Pt +m
p   w˜     +  
h
sV Ut+1( ) + (1  s)(A˜V Nt+1( ) + (1  A˜)V Ft+1( ))
i
  V it ( ),
(2.2)
the following condition is satisfied for either j = U or j = F :
w˜ +  
h
s(A˜
⇧
1    + (1  A˜)W
U
t+1) + (1  s)(A˜WNt+1 + (1  A˜)W Ft+1)
i
  W jt , (2.3)
and at least one condition is satisfied with strict inequality. Note that, as E with
At 1 = N is unable to change firms, the right hand side of the last inequality does
not include WNt . However, a firm with At 1 = N is able to renegotiate a contract
internally. Therefore, it must be true that @{w˜, A˜} such that Inequality 2.2 holds for
i = N and Inequality 2.3 holds for j = N , with one of the two holding strictly.
The next equilibrium condition pertains to labor market entry. In any period, E
enter if the expected value of entry is greater than the value of remaining out of the
market. If no E enter the labor market, it must be the case that entry yields weakly
less value than nonentry. If the maximal measure, ⌦, enters, it must be the case that
entry yields weakly greater value than nonentry. If a strictly positive measure of E
enter that is less than the maximal measure, it must be the case that entry yields
value exactly equal to the value of nonentry. Let µ¯t represent the measure of entering
E in period t. In equilibrium, entry decisions must satisfy:
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If µ¯t = 0, then  W
U
t+1   c 
 ⇧
1    (2.4)
If µ¯t 2 (0,⌦), then  WUt+1   c =
 ⇧
1    (2.5)
If µ¯t = ⌦, then  W
U
t+1   c  
 ⇧
1    (2.6)
2.3.3 Single Period Equilibrium
Ignoring intertemporal aspects of the model, I first investigate market contracts for
unmatched agents within a given period. In this model, NCAs transfer surplus from
E to R by removing the wage bonus, mw, if the firm remains together. With un-
constrained transferability of utility via the wage, any transfer made using an NCA
could alternatively be made with the wage. NCAs, however, have a negative future
e↵ect for E: if E is bound by an NCA, upon separation, E receives his outside option
in perpetuity. If the value of labor market participation is greater than E’s outside
option in any future period, this is a loss for E that is not captured by R. In other
words, when l is nonbinding, any contract with At = 1 will be dominated by a con-
tract with At = 0. When l binds, contracts with At = 0 or At = 1 may be optimal.
This intuition is captured in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3.1. Consider an equilibrium in which entry strictly dominates nonentry in
a given period. Then, contracts without NCAs are Pareto optimal for newly formed
firms. Contracts with NCAs are Pareto optimal if and only if the transferability
constraint is binding.
2.3.4 Labor Demand and Labor Supply
In this section, I construct the labor demand and labor supply curves of unmatched
agents which will be used to identify equilibrium contracts within a given period.
Standard labor demand and labor supply curves identify the measure of agents willing
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to participate at a given wage, and therefore exist in two-dimensional space. With
two-dimensional contracts, I extend the space to three-dimensions. In theory, given
an equilibrium, one may calculate the measure of E or R willing to participate in
the market for any contract. However, since agents will not use Pareto dominated
contracts, I will leverage Lemma 2.3.1 to generate an inverse labor demand function
which is a curve in three-dimensional space, as any Pareto optimal contract will either
have the form {w, 0} with w   l or {w, 1} with w < l+ (1 s)mw. That inverse labor
demand curve, along with the labor supply surface, will be used to find equilibrium
contracts.
Labor Demand
Taking future value functions as given, an unmatched R is willing to agree to the
contract {w,A} in period t if the value of hiring an employee under the contract
{w,A} is greater than  V Ut+1( ). The willingness to pay of R with production cost
  is found when the value of hiring exactly equals the value of delaying market
participation one period. This expression is given by:
Pt       w +  
h
sV Ut+1( ) + (1  s)(AV Nt+1( ) + (1  A)V Ft+1( ))
i
=  V Ut+1( ) (PCR)
This expression may be satisfied two ways since both w and A are contractual
instruments. Optimal contracts that yield R no net surplus will maximize E’s value:
max
w,A
w +  
h
s(A
⇧
1    + (1  A)W
U
t+1) + (1  s)(AWNt+1 + (1  A)W Ft+1)
i
, (2.7)
subject to the limited transferability constraint (w   l (LTC)), Equation PCR
(which functions as the participation constraint of R), and the participation con-
straint of E, which is slack, as E’s utility is being maximized. Ignoring the limited
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transferability constraint, PCR binds and may be substituted into Expression 2.7.
With unlimited transferability, the solution to this problem dictates that A = 0
whenever
(1  s)
⇣
V Nt+1( )  V Ft+1( )
⌘
< s
⇣
WUt+1  
⇧
1   
⌘
+ (1  s)(W Ft+1  WNt+1)
WUt+1 >
⇧
1    (2.8)
i.e., the net expected cost of an NCA exceeds its net expected benefit, and A = 1
otherwise. Index R by i, where indexation occurs in order of increasing costs (i.e., if
Ri has   =  H and Ri0 has   =  L, then i > i0). The greatest wage R is willing to pay
in the unconstrained environment, wˆDt (i, A), is given by meeting Ri’s participation
constraint:
wˆDt (i, A) = Pt    (i) +  (1  s)
h
AV Nt+1( (i)) + (1  A)V Ft+1( (i))  V Ut+1( (i))
i
,
where  (i) is the marginal production cost of Ri.
The case in which Inequality 2.8 is satisfied is the case on which this paper is
focused. In Section 2.4, I explain when this assumption is satisfied in equilibrium.
Under the alternative assumption, NCAs are surplus-maximizing contracts and are
used by all firms, as no constraints introduced in this paper hinder their use.
The constraint LTC, however, a↵ects NCA use when the net expected cost exceeds
the net expected benefit in the following way: for some firms, LTC and PCR may
only be simultaneously satisfied when A = 1. For example, for Ri with   =  H , LTC
and PCR are simultaneously satisfied only when
Pt    H   l +  (1  s)
h
AV Nt+1( H) + (1  A)V Ft+1( H)  V Ut+1( H)
i
> 0
If Pt  H  l+ (1 s)
h
V Ft+1( H) V Ut+1( H)
i
< 0 but Pt  H  l+ (1 s)
h
V Nt+1( H) 
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V Ut+1( H)
i
> 0, only contracts with A = 1 are acceptable for Ri with   =  H .
Let ıˆt 2 {0, pµUR,t, µUR,t} denote the employer index that serves a demarcation
between R who will accept a contract with A = 0 and those that will not, where µUR,t
is the measure of unmatched R at the beginning of period t5. Then, when Inequality
2.8 is satisfied, and taking into account the wage constraint, inverse labor demand is
given by:
{wDt (i), ADt (i)} =
8>><>>:
{wˆDt (i, 0), 0} if i  ıˆt
{wˆDt (i, 1), 1} otherwise.
(2.9)
It is assumed, here, that wˆDt (i, 1) > l 8i: i.e., a contract with A = 1 may simulta-
neously satisfy LTC and PCR.
Labor Supply
The labor supply surface may be constructed similarly to the method used for labor
demand, by calculating the contract which yields surplus identical to E’s outside op-
tion. Since unmatched E are homogeneous, inverse labor supply will be horizontal.
Furthermore, insofar as labor supply will be used as a tool to identify equilibrium
contracts at its intersection with labor demand, since all contracts on the labor de-
mand curve calculated above satisfy LTC and Pareto optimality, I may ignore those
concerns here.
The worst acceptable contracts for E solve:
w +  [s(A
⇧
1    + (1  A)W
U
t+1) + (1  s)(AWNt+1 + (1  A)W Ft+1)] = ⇧+  WUt+1
The inverse labor supply surface is given by wSt (i, A), whose domain is [0, µ
U
E,t]⇥
{0, 1} (where µUE,t represents the measure of unmatched E at the beginning of period
5It must be the case that ıˆt 2 {0, pµUR,t, µUR,t} since Ri and Ri0 with identical   will both either
have acceptable or not have acceptable contracts with A = 0.
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t):
wSt (i, A) = ⇧+  
h
(1  s(1  A))WUt+1   sA
⇧
1      (1  s)(AW
N
t+1 + (1  A)W Ft+1)
i
(2.10)
Single Period Equilibrium
Given equilibrium contracts and prices from period t+1 onwards, I use wDt (i), A
D
t (i),
and wSt (i, A) to characterize period t equilibrium contracts. I make the following
assumptions, which are necessary (but not su cient) conditions to ensure that E is
able to cover his cost of entry:
Assumption 3. µUR,t > µ
U
E,t
Assumption 4. wDt (µ
U
E,t) > w
S
t (µ
U
E,t, A
D
t (µ
U
E,t))
Assumption 3 simply says that there are more unmatched R than unmatched E at
time t. Assumption 4 ensures that there exists a contract simultaneously acceptable
to E and RµUE,t . Essentially, these assumptions guarantee that labor demand and
labor supply intersect at i = µUE,t. This condition is not essential to the analysis: it
is simply made for tractability.
Given Assumptions 3 and 4, the intersection occurs on the demand curve, and
the equilibrium contract for unmatched agents is {wt, At} = {wDt (µUE,t), ADt (µUE,t)}. If
µUE,t < ıˆt, this contract is {wˆDt (µUE,t), 0}, and if µUE,t > ıˆt, this contract is {wˆDt (µUE,t), 1}.
In other words, the existence of NCAs is a function of labor supply: when µUE,t is large,
the market contract will have an NCA.
2.4 Labor Market Dynamics
In this section, I characterize labor market dynamics by considering the intertemporal
e↵ects of contract structures. Contracts with A = 1 internally allocate surplus to R,
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and are used when the terms of trade in the market favor R but can not be met by
the wage alone. However, NCAs have an external e↵ect, as well: E are forced out
of the labor market when they are bound by NCAs. The ability of the market to
replenish itself will play a large role in determining labor market dynamics.
I begin by introducing the laws of motion of the measures of agents in the labor
market. Next, I note the existence of steady state equilibria with and without NCAs.
Finally, I show that noncompete cycles may emerge when labor market entry is limited
for E.
2.4.1 Laws of Motion
In the most general case of the model, any agent may opt not to participate in
the market. However, since all E and R for i  µUE,t may form profitable firms by
Assumptions 3 and 4, all unmatched agents except unmatched R with i > µUE,t will
participate in a given period. Members of preexisting firms will also opt to participate,
as they earn an additional quasi-rent equal to mp.
Whenever Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied, the laws of motion simplify to:
µUE,t+1 =µ¯t + s((1  At)µUE,t + µFE,t + µNE,t)
µFE,t+1 =(1  s)((1  At)µUE,t + µFE,t + µNE,t)
µNE,t+1 =(1  s)AtµUE,t
µUR,t+1 =s(µ
U
E,t + µ
F
R,t + µ
N
R,t) + µ
U
R,t   µUE,t
µFR,t+1 =(1  s)((1  At)µUE,t + µFR,t + µNR,t)
µNR,t+1 =(1  s)AtµUE,t,
where µ✓ ,t represents the measure of type  agents in period t that are unmatched
(✓ = U), members of preexisting firms with At 1 = 0 (✓ = F ), or members of
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preexisting firms with At 1 = 1 (✓ = N). These laws of motion may be interpreted
as follows: unmatched agents at time t+1 are entering agents and separating agents,
excepting E with At = 1. Agents involved in matches with or without NCAs are
simply those who signed those contracts in the prior period, net of those matches
that separated.
2.4.2 Steady State Equilibria
The existence of steady state equilibria is straightforward. When wages are uncon-
strained (l is extremely low), no contract will have A = 1, since ıˆt = µUR,t. If agents
anticipate that their values in all states in all future periods are identical, then labor
supply and labor demand will be identical in each period, leading to identical market
contracts and identical expected value of entry. There will be no exit since no E are
forced out of the market, and there is no incentive to exit given that all agents may
earn their outside option while participating in the market. If the expected value of
entry is no greater than the cost of entry, net of an agent’s outside option, then entry
will not occur, ensuring that the expectation that values in all states in all future
periods are identical is fulfilled.
Proposition 2.4.1. When the transferability limitation is low, a steady state equi-
librium exists in which no market contracts have NCAs.
When the wage constraint binds, contracts will have A = 1, and some exit will
occur. However, if the measure of new E able to enter the labor market is high, labor
supply can replenish each period to its former level. That level may yield expected
future surplus for R and E that exactly covers the cost of entry: if the market is
small, expected future surplus will be high, and entry will lower Pt (by increasing
goods market supply), decreasing the amount of surplus available to R and E. If the
expected value of entry and nonentry are equal, the size of the market will remain
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the same each period, generating an environment much like the unconstrained wage
scenario.
Proposition 2.4.2. When the transferability limitation is high and potential entry is
high, a steady state equilibrium exists in which all market contracts have NCAs.
Based on this intuition, two things must be true in order for a steady state equi-
librium not to exist for a given set of parameters: first, wages must be constrained.
Second, entry of E must be limited. Indeed, these two conditions not only rule out
steady state equilibria; they also allow cyclical equilibria to exist, as described in the
following section.
2.4.3 Cyclical Equilibria
When the wage is constrained and NCAs are used, some E are forced to exit the
market. If entry of E is limited, labor supply will be low in the next period, driving
up the market-clearing wage. If the wage is no longer constrained when labor supply
is low, all market contracts will have A = 0, and over time, labor supply may increase,
since E are not forced out of the market. As labor supply increases, the wage falls,
and eventually may become constrained once again, leading to market contracts with
A = 1. At this point, the cycle repeats as E are forced out of the market once again.
For purposes of exposition, I consider 2-cyclical equilibria. Recall the definition
from Section 2.3: in a 2-cyclical equilibrium, {Qt, wt, At} = {Qt+2n, wt+2n, At+2n}
8t, n. For the remainder of this section, I will suppose the existence of a 2-cyclical
equilibrium, derive some important features of it, and then show conditions under
which it exists. Since all variables and functions in the posited equilibrium repeat
cyclically, the subscripts 0 and 1 on equilibrium variables and functions will corre-
spond to periods t+2n (even periods) and periods t+2n+1 (odd periods), 8n 2 N.
The equilibrium is given by, for t 2 {0, 1}: contracts {wt, At}, where A0 = 0 and
A1 = 1; measures {µ✓E,t, µ✓R,t} for ✓ 2 {U, F,N}; goods market prices P0 = P (Q0) and
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P1 = P (Q1) where Qt = µUE,t + µ
F
E,t + µ
N
E,t; marginal R indices ı¯t = µ
U
E,t such that
all R with i  ı¯t participate in period t; entry of E in even periods equal to µ¯, and
entry of E in odd periods equal to ⌦. Finally, all E in the market participate in each
period.
Cyclical Equilibria Laws of Motion and Entry Condition
In any 2-cyclical equilibrium, the laws of motion may be reduced by accounting
for the cyclicality. Consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which At+2n = 0 and
At+2n+1 = 1 8n, and entry of E in periods t + 2n + 1 is equal to ⌦, as posited
above. Let µ✓ ,0 = µ
✓
 ,t+2n and µ
✓
 ,1 = µ
✓
 ,t+2n+1 for ✓ 2 {U, F,N} and  2 {E,R}.
If Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, then measures of E in each period, as functions of the
measures of E entering in each period, reduce to:
µUE,0 =
1
s
⇥
(1  s)2µ¯+ ⌦⇤
µFE,0 =
(1  s)2
s2
[(1  s)µ¯+ ⌦]
µNE,0 =
1  s
s
[µ¯+ ⌦]
µUE,1 =
1
s
[µ¯+ ⌦]
µFE,1 =
1  s
s2
[(1  s)µ¯+ ⌦]
µNE,1 = 0
The measures of R in preexisting firms in each period are simply equal to their E
counterparts: µ✓R,t = µ
✓
E,t for ✓ 2 {F,N} and t 2 {0, 1}. The measure of unmatched
R in each period, µUR,0 and µ
U
R,1, are determined by the laws of motion and the
exogenously given total measure of R, µR. In particular, these measures are the
residual R in each period:
µUR,0 = µR   µUE,0   µFE,0   µNE,0
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µUR,1 = µR   µUE,1   µFE,1   µNE,1
Substituting in the simplified laws of motion above, this simplifies to µUR,0 =
µR   1s2 ((1  s)µ¯+ ⌦) and µUR,1 = µR   1s2 ((1  s(1  s))µ¯+ ⌦).
The entry conditions for E simplify in a 2-cyclical equilibrium, as well. Since, in
odd periods, there is maximal entry, the entry condition is:
 WU0   cE  
 ⇧
1    (2.11)
At even times, the entry condition is:
 WU1   cE =
 ⇧
1   
Cyclical Equilibrium Value Functions
In addition to the laws of motion, the equilibrium value functions of agents are a↵ected
by the oscillations of the market. Continuing to consider a 2-cyclical equilibrium in
which A0 = 0 and A1 = 1, I may rewrite R’s equilibrium value functions as follows:
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V U0 ( ) =
8>><>>:
P (Q0)      w0 +  (sV U1 ( ) + (1  s)V F1 ( )) if i < µUE,0
 V U1 ( ) otherwise
V F0 ( ) = P (Q0) +m
p       w0  mw +  (sV U1 ( ) + (1  s)V F1 ( ))
V N0 ( ) = P (Q0) +m
p       w0 +  (sV U1 ( ) + (1  s)V F1 ( ))
V U1 ( ) =
8>><>>:
P (Q1)      w1 +  (sV U0 ( ) + (1  s)V N0 ( )) if i < µUE,1
 V U0 ( ) otherwise
V F1 ( ) = P (Q1) +m
p       w1  mw +  (sV U0 ( ) + (1  s)V F0 ( ))
V N1 ( ) = P (Q1) +m
p       w1 +  (sV U0 ( ) + (1  s)V F0 ( ))
Similarly, E’s value functions may be written as:
WU0 = w0 +  (sW
U
1 + (1  s)W F1 )
W F0 = w0 +m
w +  (sWU1 + (1  s)W F1 )
WN0 = w0 +  (sW
U
1 + (1  s)W F1 )
WU1 = w1 +  (s
⇧
1    + (1  s)W
N
0 )
W F1 = w1 +m
w +  (sWU0 + (1  s)W F0 )
WN1 = w1 +  (sW
U
0 + (1  s)W F0 )
Existence of 2-Cyclical Equilibria
In order for a 2-cyclical equilibrium to exist, two conditions must be satisfied: first, the
market contract must have a noncompete agreement in odd periods, which requires
that no wage greater than l may clear the market when A = 0. Second, entry of new
employees must not cover the measure of employees that exit (⌦E < sµUE,1) but must
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cover that measure over two periods. Finally, one further assumption is useful:
Assumption 5. (1 +  (1  s))( H    L)    2(1  s)2mw
Assumption 6. mp   (1 +  (1  s))mw > 0
Assumption 5 ensures that, in equilibrium, R with  L earn a larger payo↵ than
those with  H , as R with  H are more likely to have A = 1. This is important
because, otherwise, firms with  L would prefer to separate prior to odd periods in
order to mimic firms with  H . Assumption 6 guarantees that R who are members
of preexisting firms in odd periods prefer to remain together, as opposed to taking
advantage of the benefits which accumulate due to having a contract with A = 1.
Formally:
Proposition 2.4.3. When Assumptions 5 and 6 are satisfied, a 2-cyclical equilibrium
exists when the transferability limitation and potential entry are neither too large nor
too small. In that 2-cyclical equilibrium, all previously unmatched firms have NCAs
in periods t+ 2n+ 1, and do not have NCAs in periods t+ 2n, for n 2 N.
Figure 2·1 shows how the equilibrium types (steady state with A = 0, steady state
with A = 1, or 2-cycle) that exist vary according to parameterization. For large l,
steady states with A = 0 do not exist, as only contracts with A = 1 clear the market.
For small l, steady states with A = 1 do not exist since contracts with A = 0 clear
the market and dominate contracts with A = 1. Steady states with A = 1 also do
not exist for low ⌦, since labor supply is unable to replenish in one period. Finally,
2-cycles do not exist when ⌦ is large, as labor supply has the opportunity to replenish
in one period, and do not exist when ⌦ is small, as labor supply takes more than two
periods to replenish6.
6The area in the bottom right of Figure 2·1 contains (unlabeled) areas in which  -cycles exist for
  > 2.
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Figure 2·1: Areas for which there exist steady state equilibria (with
or without NCAs) and 2-cyclical equilibria.
2.5 Policy Analysis
In this section, I analyze the welfare e↵ects of implementation of a policy prohibiting
NCAs. Such a policy is under consideration for low wage workers at both national
and state levels; however, little is known about whether it would enhance or diminish
welfare. The fundamental welfare tradeo↵ is as follows: NCAs allow markets to
clear, increasing the level of production in the goods market (which may increase
both consumer and producer surplus). However, NCAs are not surplus maximizing
at the firm level, and so there is a surplus loss associated with firms who would have
participated in the market if NCAs were prohibited. In the model described in this
paper, the loss exhibits as an increase in the total entry cost paid by new workers in
each period. I consider this welfare tradeo↵ separately for steady state equilibria when
NCAs are used and for 2-cycles. The key di↵erence is that, in a cyclical equilibrium,
the increase in the level of production in the goods market exists only in periods in
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which the market is large (“odd” periods, in which firms use NCAs), and the market
may be smaller in the intervening (even) periods.
In this section, markets bound by a wage constraint may not clear without the
ability to use NCAs. I assume that, in each period, each unmatched employee’s objec-
tive and subjective probability of joining a firm is equal to the anticipated measure of
newly formed firms divided by the total measure of unmatched employees: Qt µ
F
t  µNt
µUE
.
2.5.1 Steady State Welfare Comparison
In evaluating NCA policy, I assume that a social welfare maximizing policymaker
weights all agents’ welfare equally–employers, employees, and consumers. It should
be noted throughout this section that such weights may not reflect the goals of actual
policymakers, who may place greater weight on the welfare of low-wage employees
than that of their employers. I perform welfare comparisons on a per-period basis,
and therefore, all time subscripts are dropped in this section.
When the welfare of all agents is weighted equally, the social surplus generated
under a given policy is equal to the sum of all production realized, net of all costs
paid. Social surplus, then, has five components: the first four are gross consumer
surplus (CS), employer production bonus (RB), employer costs (RC), and employee
entry costs (EC). The final component is employees’ outside options (home produc-
tion). Since all employees in the model’s universe who are not members of firms earn
⇧ each period, for purposes of comparing surplus under two policies, the relevant
comparison is in the di↵erence in the lost potential home production of employees
who are members of firms. It is this employee loss (EL) that I use in calculating social
surplus under each policy, understanding that it represents relative loss as opposed
to absolute loss.
CS is given by the area below the demand curve for all units of the consumer good
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sold:
CS ⌘
QZ
0
P (Q)dQ = PintQ  1
2
(Pint   P (Q))Q = PintQ+ ⇢
2
Q2
RB is given by RB ⌘ mp(µF + µN). RC is given by the measures of employers
paying marginal costs  L and  H respectively times the size of those costs. Let µH
and µL represent the measures of matched R with costs  H and  L, respectively:
RC ⌘ µH H + µL L. EC is given by the entry cost times the measure of entering
employees: EC ⌘ µ¯c. Finally, EL is given by the measure of matched employees
(equal to the measure of firms) times their outside option: EL ⌘ ⇧µ. Taken together,
(relative) per-period social surplus (S) is given by
S ⌘ CS +RB  RC   EC   EL.
Consider a steady state equilibrium in which A = 1 in all contracts of newly
formed firms. I assume that the intersection of labor supply and labor demand occurs
at i > pµR: the marginal employer has cost  H7. Since any employer with  H is
unwilling to pay l without an NCA (as is necessary for A = 1 to be an equilibrium
contract), the size of the market under a policy of NCA prohibition is Qx = pµR
(assuming that market has reached its steady state). Denote the market size without
such a policy as Qˆ, where Qˆ > Qx by assumption. Then, the di↵erence in surplus
generated with a prohibition on NCAs versus without, assuming the economy would
be in a steady state equilibrium with A = 1 in market contracts is given by:
7In a steady state equilibrium with A = 1 in market contracts, if the marginal employer had
marginal cost  L, no employers would form firms since the greatest wage employers are willing to
pay without an NCA is less than l. Social surplus under a policy of NCA prohibition is zero in such
a case.
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SDIFFSS ⌘ Sx   Sˆ = (CSx   CˆS) + (RBx   RˆB) + (RˆC  RCx)
+ (EˆC   ECx) + (EˆL  ELx)
= (Qx   Qˆ)Pint + ⇢(Q
x2   Qˆ2)
2
+ ((1  s)Qxmp   (1  s)Qˆmp)
+ (pµR L + (Qˆ  pµR) H  Qx L) + s2Qˆc+ (Qˆ⇧ Qx⇧)
= (pµR   Qˆ)Pint + ⇢((pµR)
2   Qˆ2)
2
+ (1  s)mp(pµR   Qˆ)
+ (Qˆ  pµR) H + s2Qˆc+ ⇧(Qˆ  pµR)
Depending on the values of the parameters, SDIFFSS may be positive or negative.
Indeed, exact calculations of surplus leave out many important elements of NCA use
not encapsulated in this model (e.g., the endogeneity of separation and NCA use,
both as it relates to the lock-in e↵ect of NCAs on poor matches and as it relates to
the increased ability of firms to realize benefits from employee retention). However,
the e↵ect of variation in exogenous parameters on SDIFFSS is una↵ected by those
external elements as long as they do not interact with those parameters. In this model,
changes in SDIFFSS are monotonic with respect to changes in many exogenous
parameters, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5.1. SDIFFSS is increasing in  H , ⇧, and s, and decreasing in mp
and Pint.
Proposition 2.5.1 yields insight into what occupations may be more likely to benefit
from policy intervention, and which would not. Most notably, assuming an occupa-
tion’s labor market is in a steady state equilibrium in which NCAs are used, those
occupations which experience high rates of exogenous separation are more likely to
benefit, from a social perspective, from policy intervention prohibiting use of NCAs.
This result coincides with the motivation of policymakers who have introduced leg-
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islation limiting enforceability of NCAs: they would likely prefer to limit NCA use
when separation rates are high, as their primary concern is fairness to workers who
need to find new jobs post-separation.
Counterintuitively, NCA nonenforcement is more likely to be optimal when em-
ployees’ outside options are high. One might imagine that, when workers have strong
outside options, strong NCA enforcement may be unimportant to workers and socially
optimal due to NCAs’ ability to help labor markets clear. However, the negative im-
pact of employees’ outside option on the size of the market as a whole decreases the
positive impact of NCA enforcement in the model. A similar argument explains the
impact of the marginal employer’s marginal cost,  H , the production bonus for firms
that remain together, mp, and the position of the goods demand curve, Pint.
2.5.2 Two-Cycle Welfare Comparison
In a cyclical equilibrium, per-period welfare comparisons depend on which stage of
the cycle is under consideration. In this section, I separately consider the di↵erence
in social surplus at each of the two stages of a 2-cycle, and additionally consider
the di↵erence in social surplus of an economy with a prohibition on NCA use versus
the unweighted average of the two stages of the cycle8. The major di↵erence in the
calculation of surplus in a steady state with NCAs versus a cycle with NCAs is that,
in the periods in which the market is small, social surplus does not benefit from the
ability of NCAs to help markets clear.
Odd Periods (A = 1)
In odd periods of a 2-cycle, NCAs are used in market contracts and the market is
relatively large. Intersection of labor supply and labor demand occurs where marginal
8If discounting were applied in the calculation of the average, the comparison of surplus would
depend on which stage is assumed to be first. To avoid this technicality, I instead consider the
unweighted average surplus of the two periods.
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cost is equal to  H , and l binds the market wage that would occur if NCAs were not
used in that period (wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1)). With a prohibition on NCA use, the market clearing
wage may be greater than or less than wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1): this is because, in a cycle, employees
anticipate greater wages in the next period conditional on remaining in the market,
but also face the risk of forced exit. For the purposes of illustrating the di↵erences in
surplus, I remain agnostic on which of the two wages is greater, but assume that the
market clearing wage with a prohibition on NCAs is bound by l9. This causes the
market size when NCAs are prohibited to be pµR, as in Section 2.5.1.
Let Sˆ1 represent social surplus, and Qˆ0 and Qˆ1 represent market size in even
and odd periods of a 2-cycle, respectively. Then, utilizing the definitions of the
components of social surplus defined above, the di↵erence in social surplus is given
by:
SDIFFcyc1 ⌘ Sx   Sˆ1 = (Qx   Qˆ1)Pint + ⇢(Q
x2   Qˆ21)
2
+ ((1  s)Qxmp   (1  s)Qˆ0mp)
+ (pµR L + (Qˆ1   pµR) H  Qx L) + ⌦c+ (Qˆ1⇧ Qx⇧)
= (pµR   Qˆ1)Pint + ⇢((pµR)
2   Qˆ21
2
+ (1  s)mp(pµR   Qˆ0)
+ (Qˆ1   pµR) H + ⌦c+ ⇧(Qˆ1   pµR)
Note that, since Qˆ0 < pµR, each of the di↵erence components of SDIFFcyc are
positive except for the di↵erence in CS: this stands in contrast to when the economy
is in a steady state with NCAs, in which case the benefit for firms which remain
together is also greater without an NCA prohibition.
Comparative statics in odd periods of a 2-cycle are identical to that in steady
state, with one exception: the model in a 2-cycle is highly sensitive to changes in s,
9In particular, l > ⇧+ c     (1  s)mw.
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and the response of social surplus depends in a complex fashion on model parameters.
The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5.2. SDIFFcyc1 is increasing in  H and ⇧, and decreasing in mp and
Pint.
Even Periods (A = 0)
In even periods of a 2-cycle, NCAs are not used in market contracts and the market is
relatively small. Intersection of labor supply and labor demand occurs where marginal
cost is equal to  L, and l does not bind the market wage.
Let Sˆ0 represent social surplus. Then, the di↵erence in social surplus is given by:
SDIFFcyc0 ⌘ Sx   Sˆ0 = (Qx   Qˆ0)Pint + ⇢(Q
x2   Qˆ20)
2
+ ((1  s)Qxmp   (1  s)Qˆ1mp)
+ (Qˆ0 L  Qx L) + µ¯c+ (Qˆ0⇧ Qx⇧)
= (pµR   Qˆ1)Pint + ⇢((pµR)
2   Qˆ20
2
+ (1  s)mp(pµR   Qˆ1)
+ (Qˆ0   pµR) L + µ¯c+ ⇧(Qˆ0   pµR)
Comparative statics in even periods of a 2-cycle are identical to those in odd
periods, resulting in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5.3. SDIFFcyc0 is increasing in  H and ⇧, and decreasing in mp and
Pint.
As the comparative statics on even and odd periods of a 2-cycle are identical, so
are the comparative statics on the average of the two. This prediction is friendly
to policymakers, as it suggests that, regardless of whethers labor markets are in a
steady state or a cycle with NCAs, the same types of industries (those with high
relative costs for marginal employers, large outside options for employees, low benefit
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to continued employment, and relatively low product demand) will benefit from policy
intervention.
2.6 Conclusion
Policymakers have largely focused on fairness concerns associated with noncompete
agreements for low-wage workers, and little is known about their e↵ects on the labor
market or their e ciency from a social perspective. In this paper, I construct a
dynamic model of the labor market which addresses these questions and highlights
the potential e↵ects on social surplus.
When noncompete agreements are used purely to transfer surplus, they are not
surplus maximizing for the firm whenever employees su↵er a loss from being forced out
of the labor market. In the model in this paper, this is true whenever there is a positive
cost of entry into the labor market for employees. When noncompete agreements do
not maximize social surplus, they are used when transferability constraints prevent
equilibration of labor markets via the wage alone. This will occur when labor supply
is high, as the market clearing wage with no noncompete agreement is low in that
case, and more likely to be constrained.
Due to the bidirectional causality between NCA use and labor supply, NCAs may
cause cyclical labor market behavior in which high NCA use is observed at a given
point in time, followed by diminished labor supply and low use of NCAs. As labor
supply replenishes, NCA use returns to a high level. Such cycles cause corresponding
cycles in associated goods markets, which result in periods of decreased production
and decreased consumer surplus.
While policies that prohibit NCA use may or may not be optimal, I highlight pa-
rameters that positively and negatively impact the social benefit of such a policy: all
else equal, when the marginal cost of high-cost employers is large, the size of employ-
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ees’ outside options is great, the benefit realized by firms from continued employment
is low, and goods demand is low, NCA prohibition is more likely to be optimal.
Future work may seek to assess other facets of NCA use, especially including the
endogenous separation decision of employees. When workers are bound by NCAs,
they may not separate from jobs in which their match quality is low. However, if
continued employment induces a large benefit (due to accumulation of specific human
capital, for example), decreased levels of separation may be beneficial. Empirically,
future work may seek to test for whether NCAs are causing labor market cycles, as
described in this paper. Time series data on industry- or occupation-specific NCA
use may be required for such a test.
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Chapter 3
E↵ortless Employee Retention: The
Impact of Noncompete Agreements on
Productivity
3.1 Introduction
In the literature pertaining to noncompete agreements (contractual agreements that
limit employees from competing with an employing firm after separation), little atten-
tion has been paid to the e↵ects such agreements have during an employee’s tenure.
Noncompete agreements may serve as a way to allocate ownership of a production
asset: a client list, human capital, trade secrets, or the employee him- or herself. In
this capacity, noncompete agreements act as a bulk purchase of specific rights that
falls short of being a purchase of residual rights (in the sense used in Grossman and
Hart (1986)). A bulk purchase of specific rights may distort investment in assets
similarly to a purchase of residual rights. That distortion, especially as it pertains
to the incentives for an employee to exert production-enhancing e↵ort, is the topic of
this paper.
Consider a service professional who may exert e↵ort that enhances the future
production value of a client list, possibly by encouraging continued patronage. The
professional may exert e↵ort for a variety of reasons: a wage contract contingent on
e↵ort or some correlated measure (Mirrlees, 1976; Holmstro¨m, 1979; Lazear, 2000),
a relational contract (Baker et al., 2002; Levin, 2003), or the desire to leverage the
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valuable client list into increased wages or an entrepreneurial venture (Gibbons and
Murphy, 1992; Holmstro¨m, 1999). If wage contracts are di cult or impossible to
write due to commitment problems, unobservability, or noncontractibility (Gibbons,
1987; Baker, 1992; Baker et al., 1994) and relational contracts fail (perhaps due to
underpowered punishments), e↵ort may still be incentivized by the ability of an em-
ployee to spin o↵ as an entrepreneur. However, if an employee spins o↵, the firm may
not be able to capture any of the revenue associated with the spin o↵. A noncom-
pete agreement allocates future value to the firm, but simultaneously diminishes the
incentive for the employee to exert e↵ort.
Although I do not explictly model the client interaction, I assume that the value
created by e↵ort exertion is employee-specific, as may be the case with a client list.
This is especially salient in the case of physicians: e↵ort exertion by a physician may
increase the relationship-specific value of their client list. If the physician spins o↵ to
create her own practice, the clients may follow that physician. Physicians, further-
more, serve as a pertinent motivating example for this paper, as e↵ort exertion among
physicians has been discussed from a variety of angles. Much of the literature has
focused on how payment schemes may avoid “those twin traps of overtreatment and
therapeutic nihilism”1 (Dranove, 1988; Ma and McGuire, 1997; McGuire, 2000). How-
ever, high e↵ort need not imply overtreatment: for example, if e↵ort is not intended
to increase the amount charged for services, but rather associated with future profits
due to client satisfaction and retention. E↵ort also may have positive externalities if
payment mechanisms undervalue patient outcomes (Ellis and McGuire, 1986).
The issue of noncompete agreements for physicians has become a topic of conver-
sation in the medical community: the American Medical Association has issued an
opinion speaking out against noncompete agreements, also known as covenants-not-
1Modern Hippocratic Oath by Dr. Louis Lasagna, available at http://www.aapsonline.org/
ethics/oaths.htm; accessed March 6, 2017.
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to-compete: “Covenants-not-to-compete restrict competition, can disrupt continuity
of care, and may limit access to care.”2 This recommendation follows the longstand-
ing recommendation of the American Bar Association for lawyers not to enter into
noncompete agreements: “A lawyer shall not participate in o↵ering or making... [an]
agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination...”3 The
justification for this prohibition is that it “...limits [lawyers’] professional autonomy
[and] limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.”4 For further discussion of
physician noncompete agreements, see Lavetti et al. (2016).
In spite of the opinions of the aforementioned professional associations, little atten-
tion has been given in the economic literature to the e↵ects of noncompete agreements
on service occupations, and physicians in particular. The inattention is not due to
a lack of use of noncompete agreements: while the estimates vary (19% of physi-
cians in a nationally representative survey of workers in all occupations (Bishara and
Starr, 2016) and 45% in a survey of primary care physicians (Lavetti et al., 2016)), a
significant portion of physicians work under a noncompete agreement.
In this paper, the relationship-specificity of the value of production creates a bi-
lateral monopoly between employer and employee: if the employee quits, the asset’s
productive value is lost to the firm. However, the employee may not use the asset
to spin o↵ a new firm if she has a noncompete agreement. This bilateral monopoly
introduces incentives for the employee to exert e↵ort even in the presence of a non-
compete agreement. The optimal e↵ort level, though, is generally lower than that
2American Medical Association Opinion E 9.02. Available at https://www.ama-assn.org/
sites/default/files/media-browser/public/hod/i14-ceja-reports 0.pdf; accessed March 5, 2017.
3American Bar Association Rule 5.6. Available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/publications/model rules of professional conduct/rule
5 6 restrictions on rights to practice.html; accessed March 5, 2017.
4American Bar Association Comment on Rule 5.6. Available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules
of professional conduct/rule 5 6 restrictions on rights to practice/comment on rule 5 6.html;
accessed March 5, 2017.
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when the employee may spin o↵ or threaten to spin o↵, as she is only able to appro-
priate a portion of the rents generated from e↵ort exertion. Without a noncompete
agreement, e↵ort may move closer to the first best but may also exceed first best
e↵ort levels. Even if the agent does not intend to spin o↵, she may exert e↵ort in
an attempt to increase her bargained wage, which is a function of both incumbent
profits and potential spin o↵ profits. These skewed incentives may counterintuitively
create an environment in which noncompete agreements are optimal when the value
of a spin o↵ is low (i.e., when spin o↵ is an empty threat) even if they are suboptimal
otherwise. I also show that e↵ort is never first best when the firm uses a noncompete
agreement, but may be first best (or close) when the value of a spin o↵ is high, or the
marginal contribution of e↵ort to profit is close for the incumbent firm and a spin o↵.
If the value of a spin o↵ is unknown when e↵ort is exerted, noncompete agree-
ments which are optimal ex ante may ine ciently lock agents in ex post if the spin
o↵ ultimately has high value. Taking as given whether or not a contract includes
a noncompete agreement and assuming that an employee would choose to spin o↵
if able, the ex post e ciency di↵erence under a contract with a noncompete agree-
ment versus without is greater in a decentralized equilibrium versus under the first
best: since the agent’s e↵ort exertion su↵ers with a noncompete agreement compared
with first best e↵ort, there is an additional e ciency loss from using a noncompete
agreement.
The two papers most closely related to this one are Motta and Roende (2002)
(MR) and Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2009) (KS). In both of those papers, e↵ort increases the
probability of valuable innovation. Both papers show that noncompete agreements
eliminate a principal’s ability to commit to increasing an agent’s wage following an
innovation, which decreases the agent’s incentives to exert e↵ort in the first place.
The deviation of this paper is the nature of the asset and the ramifications thereof.
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While MR and KS assume that e↵ort increases the probability of an innovation which
is a general asset (i.e., an asset which may be used by the incumbent firm with or
without the employee or by any new firm), I assume that the value of production is
specific to the employee. This partially alleviates the commitment problem suggested
under noncompete agreements in MR and KS, since the agent will appropriate some
portion of production via bargaining in the bilateral monopoly created.
Other related papers in the noncompete agreement literature include Lavetti et al.
(2016), in which the ability of principals to lease a client list to agents, instead of
selling it, causes noncompete agreements to result in optimal allocation of clients
within firms. That paper considers e↵ort exertion, but does not consider e↵ort exer-
tion which increases the value of production, over which an employee can bargain at a
later time period. Two papers which model the decision of whether or not to include
a noncompete agreement in a contract are Rauch and Watson (2015) and Chapter
1: the former models the decision of a firm to include a noncompete agreement to
protect the value of client relationships, but does not model the e↵ort decision of
employees. The latter considers low-wage labor markets and shows that noncompete
agreements which do not maximize a firm’s surplus may be used when the firm faces
wage constraints.
Finally, in the incomplete contracting literature, many papers have considered
the value of noncontractible investments, including Hart and Moore (1988), Aghion
and Tirole (1994), No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995), Tirole (1999), and Che and Hausch
(1999). This paper contributes to that literature by applying the theory of noncon-
tractible investment directly to e↵ort decisions under a particular type of ownership
structure: the noncompete agreement, which, in this context, allocates ownership of
a client list to the principal. Furthermore, the necessity of retaining the agent for
production, assumed in this paper, departs from the classical research and develop-
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ment framework in which the innovation may be used by the principal alone. This
departure highlights the role of noncompete agreements, which provide protection for
assets specific to the agent.
In Section 3.2, I introduce the model. In Section 3.3, I derive, from the perspective
of a social-surplus-maximizing planner, the first best e↵ort and spin o↵ decisions of an
agent given contract type (with a noncompete agreement or without), and consider the
first best contracting decision of the firm. In Section 3.4, I analyze the decentralized
equilibrium of the model given contract type, including a comparison of e↵ort levels,
and analyze the problem of the firm by endogenizing contract type. Section 3.5
compares first best e↵ort levels to those chosen in the decentralized equilibrium.
Section 3.6 extends the model by including uncertainty in the value of an agent’s spin
o↵, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model has two actors: a principal (P ) and an agent (A). There are two time
periods indexed by t, and two decisions in the model: at t = 1, A decides on an e↵ort
level, e 2 [0,1). A’s e↵ort, known only to A, determines the value of production at
t = 2 and may therefore be interpreted as investment in a crucial production asset.
At t = 2, A decides whether to remain with her current firm (D = 0), spin o↵ to
create a new firm (D = 1), or become unemployed (D = 2). If A has a noncompete
(NCA = 1), A is not allowed to spin o↵. This decision occurs after A’s second period
wage, w2(NCA, e), has been negotiated, but prior to production (since production
depends on whether A stays or spins o↵).
Payo↵s consist of production, wages (paid from P to A in each period), and e↵ort
cost. P receives the value of production at t = 1: ⇡1. At t = 2, if D = 0, P receives
the value of production, ⇡2(e). If D = 1, A receives the value of spin o↵ production,
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V (e), and P receives ⇡n, the value of production without A. If D = 2, A receives her
outside option, VA, and P receives ⇡n.
The firm’s contract in t = 1, {w1, NCA}, is initially considered to be exogenous,
where wF1 represents the t = 1 wage when A is free to spin o↵ (NCA = 0) and
wN1 represents the t = 1 wage when A may not compete (NCA = 1). In Sections
3.3.2 and 3.4.4, I consider endogenous contract choice in the planner’s problem and
the decentralized equilibrium, respectively. The second period wage, w2(NCA, e), is
determined endogenously via Nash bargaining, where P ’s outside option is ⇡n and
A’s outside option is the greater of V (e) and VA when NCA = 0, and is VA when
NCA = 1. P ’s (exogenous) Nash bargaining coe cient is ↵ 2 [0, 1] and A’s is 1  ↵.
This form of wage determination represents the bilateral monopoly induced by the
specificity of production: a given value of e induces di↵erent levels of production at
the incumbent firm versus a spin o↵ firm, and additionally, if A leaves the firm, P
receives a lower value of production unrelated to e.
The cost of e↵ort, borne by A at t = 1, is given by c(e). P and A discount at
common rate  .
For the purposes of highlighting the interaction between A remaining with her
current firm versus spinning o↵, I assume that VA is low and thus, D = 2 is never
optimal. VA therefore simply represents A’s outside option in Nash bargaining when
NCA = 1, and I omit payo↵s when D = 2 from the payo↵ function.
Payo↵s may be written as:
ZA(w1, NCA, e,D) =w1   c(e) +  ( (D = 0 or NCA = 1)w2(NCA, e)
+ (D = 1 and NCA = 0)V (e))
ZP (w1, NCA, e,D) =⇡1   w1 +  ( (D = 0 or NCA = 1)(⇡2(e)  w2(NCA, e))
+ (D = 1 and NCA = 0)⇡n)
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I assume that production, e↵ort and the spin o↵ decision are noncontractible.
While e may technically be calculated from ⇡2(e) or V (e) if those functions are in-
vertible, inclusion of a white noise term along with risk aversion on the part of A
renders contracts based on production subject to moral hazard (Holmstro¨m, 1979).
For the purpose of highlighting the e↵ort decision as it is motivated by wage at the
current firm or spin o↵ profits, I omit these considerations and simply assume that
actors may not write forward compensation contracts on future production. Forward
compensation contracts are also subject to a commitment problem: once e↵ort is
sunk, P may renege on the contract if it is profitable.
Furthermore, I assume that c0(e) > 0, V 0(e) > 0, and ⇡02(e) > 0: e↵ort is costly
but it increases production values. I also assume that V (e) > VA 8e: at worst, a
spin o↵ is more valuable than A’s outside option (which may be, for example, in a
di↵erent field than A’s area of expertise). Similarly, I assume that ⇡2(e) > VA+⇡n 8e:
a firm’s production is greater than the sum of its members’ outside options. These
assumptions ensure that D = 2 is never chosen in equilibrium, as mentioned above.
I assume that all functions are twice continuously di↵erentiable.
Finally, I assume that contracts are ex-post nonrenegotiable. While A may be
able to buy out of a noncompete agreement, such a process is likely wrought with
frictions: for example, informational asymmetries (if, for example, A may observe the
value of her investment and P may not), constraints on available funds (such as an
inability to borrow), the cost of the time spent renegotiating (which may deplete the
value of the e↵ort exertion if production does not occur during that time), or legal
fees associated with writing a new contract5. See Rauch and Watson (2015) for more
5Additionally, buyout may not change the qualitative predictions of the model, but may simply
reduce their magnitude: if A were to be able to buyout of a noncompete contract, the bilateral
monopoly would still exist due to the noncompete agreement. Incumbent firm productivity would
enter into the bargaining problem only if bargaining breakdown is assumed to result in A returning
to the incumbent firm. If bargaining breakdown is assumed to result in each actor receiving her
outside option (as may be the case if the ill will created through failed bargaining causes a breakdown
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discussion of liquidity constraints and ex post noncompete agreement renegotiation.
In Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, equilibrium is given as follows: when initial contracts
are taken as exogenous (i.e., {w1, NCA} is given), an equilibrium is given by {e,D}
such that {e,D} maximizes ZA(w1, NCA, e,D). When initial contracts are endoge-
nous, an equilibrium is {w1, NCA, e,D}, where {e,D} maximizes ZA(w1, NCA, e,D)
and the initial contract, {w1, NCA}, is Pareto optimal given e and D: i.e., there
does not exist another contract {w0, NCA0} such that
ZA(w
0, NCA0, e,D)   ZA(w1, NCA, e,D)
and
ZP (w
0, NCA0, e,D)   ZP (w1, NCA, e,D),
with one inequality holding strictly. Note that w2(NCA, e) is the result of a nonco-
operative bargaining game; however, I omit it from the definition of equilibrium. In
the planner’s problem, it is simply a transfer between P and A and does not a↵ect
total surplus. In the decentralized problem, it is simply given by the solution to the
Nash bargaining problem. Further discussion is provided in the relevant sections.
In Section 3.6, D may be a function of the idiosyncratic shock to spin o↵ value,
" (which is described in detail in Section 3.6). Furthermore, given the uncertainty in
the model, e must maximize E[ZA(w1, NCA, e,D)], and {w1, NCA} must be Pareto
optimal over E[ZA(w1, NCA, e, D("))] and E[ZP (w1, NCA, e,D("))].
First, I consider the problem from the perspective of a social planner whose goal is
to maximize the sum of agents’ utilities. Then, I consider the decentralized problem
and compare the outcome with that of the planner’s problem.
in P and A’s relationship), the incumbent firm’s productivity would not enter into the bargained
buyout.
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3.3 Planner’s Problem
Consider a social planner whose goal is to maximize the objective function
ZA(w1, NCA, e,D) + ZP (w1, NCA, e,D).
I first consider the optimal action of the planner taking the firm’s initial contract as
given and simply selecting {e,D}, and then consider the optimal action of the planner
allowing the planner to also choose the contract of the firm, i.e., when the planner
may choose {w1, NCA, e,D}.
3.3.1 Exogenous Contracts
When the initial contract of a firm, {w1, NCA}, is taken as exogenous by the planner,
the planner simply chooses e and D in order to maximize the firm’s joint surplus.
When NCA = 0, this problem quickly simplifies to:
max
e,D
⇡1   c(e) +   [ (D = 0)⇡2(e) + (D = 1)(V (e) + ⇡n)] (3.1)
Since wages are simply transfers between agents, both w1 (which is given exogenously)
and w2 drop out of the planner’s problem: in particular, even taken as a choice
variable, any value of w2 may be part of any solution to the planner’s problem.
The solution to Problem 3.1, the first best values of e and D, may be found by
maximizing over e for each possible value of D, and then taking the overall maximum
over values of D. Assume that second order conditions are satisfied locally. Then, for
D = 0, the optimal e↵ort level is e¯F0 , which solves c
0(e¯F0 ) =  ⇡
0
2(e¯
F
0 ). For D = 1, the
optimal e↵ort level is e¯F1 , which solves c
0(e¯F1 ) =  V
0(e¯F1 ).
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The planner selects DF , the first best spin o↵ decision, by comparing:
D = 0:   c(e¯F0 ) +  (⇡2(e¯F0 ))
D = 1:   c(e¯F1 ) +  (V (e¯F1 ) + ⇡n)
When NCA = 1, the planner maximizes:
max
e,D
⇡1   c(e) +  ⇡2(e) (3.2)
The optimal value of e is e¯N which solves c0(e¯N) =  ⇡02(e¯
N). The planner selects
DN = 0 by default, since DN = 1 is not available.
3.3.2 Endogenous Contracts
Given the planner’s choices of e and D, it is immediate to extend the planner’s
problem to the choice of the firm’s initial contract:
Proposition 3.3.1. For a social planner, an initial contract with NCA = 0 always
weakly dominates an initial contract with NCA = 1.
3.4 Decentralized Equilibrium with Exogenous Contracts
I begin by analyzing the decentralized equilibrium when first period contracts are
given exogenously. While this analysis is primarily performed to highlight the role of
noncompete agreements in limiting implicit e↵ort incentives, it may be the case that
noncompete agreements are written into contracts for reasons which are orthogonal
to the model at hand. For example, noncompete agreements may promote general
human capital investment. While human capital investment certainly may a↵ect firm
production, the mechanism by which noncompete agreements eliminate incentives
created by future spin o↵ opportunities will remain. Furthermore, once the noncom-
pete agreement portion of a contract is decided, firms may act as price takers in wage
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determinations, causing wages to be exogenous to firms’ internal decisions.
3.4.1 The Model with NCA = 0
Without a noncompete agreement, A’s ability to spin o↵ a↵ects payo↵s at t = 2
directly if A ultimately chooses D = 1, or indirectly by changing the Nash bargaining
outside option of A. This direct e↵ect changes A’s incentives at t = 1, since the
marginal benefit of additional e↵ort exertion now includes the increase in spin o↵
production.
I solve the model backwards, beginning with t = 2. A will select D = 0 if
w2(0, e) > V (e) and otherwise select D = 1. Given e, the Nash bargaining problem
is:
w2(0, e) = max
w
(⇡2(e)  w   ⇡n)↵(w   V (e))1 ↵
The solution is w2(0, e) = (1   ↵)(⇡2(e)   ⇡n) + ↵V (e). Bargaining breaks down
whenever ⇡2(e)   ⇡n < V (e) (the total value of agents’ outside options is greater
than the value of a successful bargaining process), which is exactly equivalent to
w2(0, e) < V (e). Therefore, bargaining succeeds and D = 0 whenever ⇡2(e)   ⇡n >
V (e). Bargaining fails and D = 1 otherwise.
Moving to t = 1, choice of e a↵ects the extensive margin of whether to spin o↵ or
remain, as well as the intensive margins of V (e) and w2(0, e). A selects e to maximize
her discounted payo↵:
e⇤ = argmax
e
wF1   c(e) +  max{V (e), (1  ↵)(⇡2(e) + "  ⇡n) + ↵(V (e))}
I rewrite the problem by separately considering values of e for which V (e) <
w2(0, e) and V (e) > w2(0, e), and then taking the greater of the two. Assuming the
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former, optimal e↵ort, e⇤0, is given by the solution to
 ((1  ↵)⇡02(e⇤0) + ↵V 0(e⇤0)) = c0(e⇤0) (3.3)
whenever the second order condition,  ((1 ↵)⇡002(e⇤0)+↵V 00(e⇤0)) < c00(e⇤0), is satisfied6.
Assuming that V (e) + " > w2(0, e), optimal e↵ort, e⇤1, is given by the solution to
 V 0(e⇤1) = c
0(e⇤1) (3.4)
whenever the second order condition,  V 00(e⇤1) < c
00(e⇤1), is satisfied.
The equilibrium is:
{e⇤, D⇤} =
8>><>>:
{e⇤0, 0} if V (e⇤1) < ⇡2(e⇤0)  ⇡n
{e⇤1, 1} otherwise
3.4.2 The Model with NCA = 1
When NCA = 1, A will always, by assumption, choose D = 0. The relevant Nash
bargaining problem is given by
w2(1, e) = max
w
(⇡2(e)  w   ⇡n)↵(w   VA)1 ↵
The solution is w2(1, e) = (1  ↵)(⇡2(e)  ⇡n) + ↵VA.
At t = 1, A chooses e by solving
max
e
wN1   c(e) +  w2(1, e) (3.5)
The optimal value, e⇤⇤, is given by the solution to  (1 ↵)⇡02(e⇤⇤) = c0(e⇤⇤) when-
ever the second order condition,  (1   ↵)⇡002(e⇤⇤) < c00(e⇤⇤), is satisfied. The equilib-
6Of course, there may be a multiplicity of solutions to this and subsequent maximizations. In
the following section, I impose assumptions that guarantee a unique solution to each maximization
problem.
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rium, then, is {e⇤⇤, 0}.
3.4.3 Comparison of e⇤ and e⇤⇤
Without further assumptions, it is di cult to compare e⇤ and e⇤⇤. The following
assumption simplifies the analysis greatly, allowing for straightforward comparative
statics:
Assumption 7. The solutions to Problems 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 exist and are unique.
One su cient condition for uniqueness is that c00(e) > 0, ⇡002(e) < 0, and V
00(e) < 0
8e: i.e., that e↵ort cost is globally convex and production values are globally concave.
When Assumption 7 is satisfied, whether A selects D = 0 or D = 1 under
NCA = 0 becomes critically important. When D⇤ = 0, the e↵ect of NCAs on
e↵ort is unambiguous. Since A’s incentive to exert e↵ort in order to increase her bar-
gained wage by increasing ⇡2(e) exists with or without an NCA, the added incentive
from increasing her bargained wage by increasing V (e) (his e↵ective outside option)
causes e↵ort levels to be greater under NCA = 0.
Proposition 3.4.1. Under Assumption 7, when A remains at her firm, e↵ort is
greater with no NCA than with an NCA.
When D⇤ = 1, a comparison of e↵ort levels with NCA = 0 versus NCA = 1
depends on the marginal contribution of e↵ort to V (e) versus ⇡2(e). In particular, if
A must remain with her firm because NCA = 1, her marginal benefit of e↵ort is her
bargained portion of the increase in ⇡2(e). If NCA = 0, her marginal benefit of e↵ort
is the marginal benefit of e↵ort to spinning o↵.
Proposition 3.4.2. Under Assumption 7, when A spins o↵, e↵ort is greater with no
NCA than with an NCA if V 0(e) > (1  ↵)⇡02(e).
Due to the bilateral monopoly induced by di↵erential values of production, when
A does not spin o↵, e↵ort is unambiguously greater with no noncompete agreement,
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even though the incentive provided by spinning o↵ is mediated by wage bargaining.
When A does spin o↵, the di↵erence in e↵ort is dependent on the di↵erence in the
marginal benefits to production for the incumbent firm versus a spin o↵ firm.
3.4.4 Decentralized Equilibrium Analysis with Endogenous Contracts
In this section, I analyze the contracting decision of the firm. With no contracting
frictions, choice of NCA will maximize the surplus of the firm, subject to A’s e↵ort
and spin o↵ decisions: correctly anticipating e and D, firms will select NCA = 1 if
the net benefit of the NCA is positive.
Proposition 3.4.3. If A does not spin o↵, contracts with NCAs uniquely maximize
surplus if and only if  (⇡2(e⇤⇤) V (e⇤1) ⇡n) > c(e⇤⇤) c(e⇤1). If A spins o↵, contracts
with NCAs uniquely maximize surplus if and only if  (⇡2(e⇤⇤) ⇡2(e⇤0)) > c(e⇤⇤) c(e⇤0).
3.5 Planner’s Problem versus Decentralized Equilibrium
In addition to comparing e↵ort levels across contract types, e↵ort levels in the decen-
tralized problem may be compared to the first best levels achieved in the planner’s
problem given contract type. E↵ort may vary for two reasons: first, if A and P re-
main partnered, A’s marginal benefit of e↵ort is not identical to the marginal social
benefit of e↵ort. Second, the choice of D is based on di↵erent objective functions in
the two di↵erent problems. Anticipated choice of D a↵ects choice of e by changing
A’s marginal benefit of e↵ort.
On the intensive margin, e↵ort level in the decentralized equilibrium meets the
first best established by the planner’s problem when NCA = 0 and DF = D⇤ = 1
(i.e., e¯F1 = e
⇤
1). This is because the marginal social and marginal private benefits of
e↵ort are both V 0(e) when A creates a spin o↵.
When NCA = 0 and DF = D⇤ = 0, the marginal social benefit of e↵ort is the
marginal contribution of e↵ort to ⇡2(e). The marginal private benefit to A is the
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marginal contribution of e↵ort to the Nash bargained wage, which contains a convex
combination of ⇡2(e) and V (e). Compare this with the e↵ort levels when NCA = 1.
The planner’s problem is unchanged. However, there is no contribution to marginal
private benefit from V (e), since A does not have the option to spin o↵. This implicit
incentive, which in some cases may allow decentralized e↵ort decisions to be closer to
first best, is eliminated when NCA = 1.
Proposition 3.5.1. Assume that A does not spin o↵ in the decentralized equilibrium
or the planner’s problem. Then, e⇤⇤ < e⇤ < e¯F0 = e¯
N if V 0(e¯F0 ) < ⇡
0
2(e¯
F
0 ), and
e⇤⇤ < e¯F0 = e¯
N < e⇤ if V 0(e¯F0 ) > ⇡
0
2(e¯
F
0 ).
In the case that V 0(e¯F0 ) > ⇡
0
2(e¯
F
0 ), e↵ort may be quite close to the e↵ort chosen
in the planner’s problem if V 0(e¯F0 )  ⇡02(e¯F0 ) is not large, though a precise comparison
depends on the exact functions.
At the extensive margin, the marginal parameter values at which the planner
would change from DF = 0 to DF = 1 are di↵erent than the analagous marginal
parameter values when A determines D: not only are e↵ort levels di↵erent (as de-
scribed above), there is also a wedge introduced because, to A at t = 2, the cost of
e↵ort is sunk, whereas the planner optimizes over e and D jointly. Even if e¯F0 = e
⇤
0
and e¯F1 = e
⇤
1, if parameter values were such that A ended up indi↵erent between
D = 0 and D = 1 at t = 2, the planner would have chosen D = 1 if e¯F0 > e¯
F
1 , and
D = 0 otherwise, since the planner would simply select the value of D that induces
the lowest cost of e↵ort7.
The more interesting comparison at the extensive margin is of the di↵erence be-
tween the decentralized problem and the planner’s problem for NCA = 0 versus
NCA = 1, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5.2. When NCA = 1, e↵ort in a decentralized equilibrium is never
first best. When NCA = 0, e↵ort in a decentralized equilibrium is first best whenever
7The condition that eP0 > e
P
1 is satisfied, roughly speaking, whenever the marginal benefit of
e↵ort to ⇡2 is greater than the marginal benefit of e↵ort to V .
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A spins o↵ in the decentralized equilibrium and the planner’s problem, or when the
marginal contribution of e↵ort to incumbent and spino↵ production is equal.
The three possible conditions state that the marginal benefit of e↵ort must be
equivalent: either the planner and A both seek to maximize V (e)  c(e) (as in Con-
dition 1), or the marginal benefits of e↵ort for the incumbent firm and the spin o↵
are equal, in which case the marginal increase of the bargained wage due to e↵ort is
identical to the marginal increases in productivity (as in Conditions 2 and 3). While
Conditions 2 and 3 are unlikely to hold exactly, if ⇡02(e) and V
0(e) are close for all e,
e⇤ will be close to the first best level. Additionally, if the value of a spin o↵ is high,
e↵ort will be first best with no noncompete agreement. The same is not true when
the firm has a noncompete agreement.
3.6 Idiosyncratic Shocks to Productivity
Prior to this section, I have assumed that V (e) is nonstochastic. This assumption is
reasonable if markets are relatively stable and e↵ort is a strong indicator of future
value. All previous analysis does not change if a common shock additively a↵ects
⇡2(e) and V (e): in this case, the shock is meant to model a market-level productivity
shock or a shock to the productivity of the relationship between A and her clients.
However, an alternative assumption is that V (e) is subject to an idiosyncratic shock
(or the shocks a↵ecting the two production functions are idiosyncratic). To this end,
for the remainder of this section, I assume that V (e) is subject to an idiosyncratic spin
o↵ shock, "8. The shock is distributed according to distribution G (i.e., " ⇠ G(")).
8The model prior to this point could have contained a common shock, "c, which is realized at
t = 2 and added to V (e) and ⇡2(e). Since the common shock does not a↵ect decisions, it has no
e↵ect on the analysis and is therefore omitted. It may, however, serve as a justification for the
noncontractibility of e↵ort: P may deduce e↵ort from nonstochastic production if ⇡2(e) or V (e) is
invertible, but may not do so when production is stochastic, leading to an inability to use severe
punishments for deviations from optimal e↵ort. If one were to use the common shock above and
maintain it in this section, addition of the idiosyncratic shock to V (e), ", would result in the same
analysis as is presented here.
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I assume that G(") is continuously di↵erentiable. Denote the associated probability
density function by g("). Finally, I use the normalization EG["] = 0.
The goal of this section is to highlight the lock-in e↵ect of NCAs: while NCAs may
maximize a firm’s surplus ex ante, they may be ex post ine cient if the idiosyncratic
shock to spin o↵ productivity is large. I also highlight the e↵ect of e↵ort on the
extensive margin, which is incalculable ex ante, in contrast with Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
3.6.1 Planner’s Problem
The major di↵erence in the analysis of the stochastic model is that A can not calculate
the optimal level of D prior to realization of the shocks. Therefore, her choice of e
must be based on the expectation of future actions. I assume this to be true for the
planner, as well: while the planner may write contingency plans based on the level of
the shock, D("), she must select e prior to realization of the shocks.
Therefore, when NCA = 0, the planner’s problem is:
e¯F = argmax
e
⇡1   c(e) +  E
⇥
(DF (") = 1)(V (e) + "+ ⇡n) + (D
F (") = 0)(⇡2(e))
⇤
(3.6)
where DF (") maximizes t = 2 joint utility. In particular, DF (") = 1 whenever
" > ⇡2(e)   V (e)   ⇡n. The following assumption regarding the right hand side of
that expression simplifies matters significantly:
Assumption 8. Let B(e) ⌘ ⇡2(e)   V (e)   ⇡n. B(e) is strictly monotonic on its
domain (either B0(e) > 0 or B0(e) < 0).
Assumption 8 simply requires that e↵ort either increase or decrease the value of
a spin o↵ relative to the value of incumbent firm production. Under Assumption 8,
the ex ante probability that DF (") = 1 is equal to 1   G(B(e)). Proceeding under
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Assumption 8 and substituting DF ("), Problem 3.6 reduces to:
e¯F = argmax
e
⇡1   c(e) +  
⇥
(1 G(B(e)))(V (e) + µH(e) + ⇡n) +G(B(e))⇡2(e)
⇤
where µH(e) = E["|" > B(e)].
Therefore, e¯F solves:
c0(e¯F ) =  
h
(1 G(B(e¯F )))(V 0(e¯F ) + µH0(e¯F )) +G(B(e¯F ))⇡02(e¯F )
 G(B(e¯F ))B0(e¯F )(V (e¯F )  ⇡2(e¯F ) + µH(e¯F ) + ⇡n)
⇤
.
The terms on the first line of the right hand side represent the increase in pro-
duction, as well as the change in the conditional expectation of ", given an increase
in e. The second line reflects the change in the probability that DF = 0 versus 1.
Substituting the values of B(e) and µH0 (given by µH0(e) = B
0(e)G(B(e))(µH(e) B(e))
1 G(B(e)) )
yields a reduced definition of e¯F :
c0(e¯F ) =  
⇥
(1 G(B(e¯F )))V 0(e¯F ) +G(B(e¯F ))⇡02(e¯F )
⇤
When NCA = 1, the problem is nearly identical to that given when NCA = 1 in
Section 3.3.1, and e¯N solves c0(e¯N) =  ⇡02(e¯
N).
3.6.2 Decentralized Equilibrium and Contract Choice
In a decentralized equilibrium, the e↵ort choice of A reflects uncertainty over the
optimal choice of D, similar to the planner’s problem. Mirroring the analysis in
Section 3.4, the incentive for A to exert e↵ort is diminished when NCA = 1 versus
when NCA = 0 due to the inability to spin o↵ and the inability to leverage the threat
of spinning o↵.
When NCA = 0, the second period bargaining problem results in w⇤2(e) = (1  
↵)(⇡2(e)   ⇡n) + ↵(V (e) + "). A selects D⇤ = 1 whenever V (e) + " > w⇤2(e), which
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reduces to " > B(e). Given e, A’s choice of D matches the planner’s choice.
Equilibrium e↵ort solves:
c0(e⇤) =  E
⇥
g(B(e))B0(e)(w⇤2(e)  V (e)  µH(e)  ⇡n) + V 0(e)
+G(B(e))((1  ↵)(⇡02(e)  V 0(e)) + µH0(e)
⇤
Define µL(e) = E["|" < B(e)]. The derivative of µL(e) is given by
µL0(e) =
B0(e)G(B(e))(B(e)  µL(e))
G(B(e))
Substituting for w⇤2(e), B(e), µ
H0(e), and subsequently, µL0(e), the equation defining
e⇤ reduces to:
c0(e⇤) = G(B(e⇤))((1  ↵)⇡02(e⇤) + ↵V 0(e⇤)) + (1 G(B(e⇤)))V 0(e⇤)
When NCA = 1, equilibrium e↵ort solves c0(e⇤⇤) =  (1  ↵)⇡02(e⇤⇤) and D⇤⇤ = 0
(by default).
Comparison of e↵ort levels under the two contract types in both the planner’s
problem and the decentralized equilibrium hinges in large part on B0(e): when the
marginal increase in spin o↵ production is greater than the marginal increase in in-
cumbent production (i.e., B0(e) < 0), the contract with NCA = 0 yields greater
e↵ort in both the planner’s problem and the decentralized equilibrium than the con-
tract with NCA = 1. Additionally, e↵ort exertion under NCA = 0 is greater in the
decentralized equilibrium than the planner’s problem and lower when NCA = 1:
Proposition 3.6.1. If B0(e) < 0, then A overexerts e↵ort with no NCA and under-
exerts e↵ort with an NCA, relative to the planner’s problem.
In other words, as long as the marginal contribution of e↵ort to spin o↵ production
is greater than the marginal contribution of e↵ort to incumbent production, e↵ort is
greater than first best with no noncompete agreement, and lower than first best with
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a noncompete agreement.
3.6.3 Ex Post E ciency
Another way to compare contracts with NCA = 0 to contracts with NCA = 1 is to
compare ex post surplus–i.e., the joint surplus generated conditional on knowledge
of the shock. When production is nonstochastic, simply assuming that production
occurs (either at the incumbent firm or at a spin o↵ firm) is enough to ensure that ex
ante surplus maximization implies ex post surplus maximization. However, with id-
iosyncratic shocks, A may become locked in by an NCA, causing the e cient decision
under a large realization of " (which is for A to spin o↵) to be unavailable.
In the planner’s problem, the ex post e ciency loss of NCA = 1 versus NCA = 0
is due primarily to the loss of option value: the lock-in of a contract with an NCA.
In the decentralized equilibrium, there is a secondary loss due to the wedge between
marginal cost and marginal benefit of e↵ort driven by the more P friendly nature of
the bilateral monopoly at t = 2 caused by the NCA. Furthermore, e↵ort incentives
under NCA = 0 in the decentralized equilibrium include the value of spin o↵ profit
in the bargained wage, bringing e⇤ closer to the e↵ort level that would be optimal if
D = 1 was known at t = 1.
Therefore, when comparing surplus ex post under values of " such that D = 1 if
NCA = 0 in the planner’s problem and the decentralized equilibrium, the di↵erence
in ex post surplus for contracts with NCA = 0 versus NCA = 1 is always greater in
the decentralized equilibrium than it is in the planner’s problem. This is true even
when NCA = 1 is ex ante surplus maximizing in the decentralized equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6.2. The surplus loss from the contract NCA = 1 versus NCA = 0
is greater under the decentralized equilibrium than the planner’s problem.
This proposition highlights the lock-in e↵ect of noncompete agreements: the ex
post e ciency loss may be extremely high if " is able to take high values which are
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relatively unlikely. This loss would be mitigated if A were able to buy out of her
noncompete agreement with no additional costs (such as bargaining costs, borrowing
costs, or legal fees).
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated the e↵ects of noncompete agreements on the e↵ort of
employees who may entrepreneurially spin o↵ to create their own firms. Noncompete
agreements diminish the implicit incentives for employees to exert e↵ort due to their
inability to start their own firms. In a decentralized equilibrium, e↵ort may be close
to or equal to the first best when employees do not have noncompete agreements,
but is always strictly less than the first best when they do. Noncompete agreements
may also cause an ex post ine ciency due to lock-in (the inability to spin o↵ a
more productive firm). This ine ciency is larger when decisions are decentralized,
compared with the first best.
Noncompete agreements may arise for a variety of reasons. If the mechanisms
described in this paper exhaustively describe the costs and benefits of noncompete
agreements, there is no need for policymakers to intervene by encouraging or dis-
couraging use of noncompete agreements: in the absence of contracting frictions or
externalities, any e cient decision made by private actors will be socially e cient.
However, if noncompete agreements arise for reasons external to this model, the e↵ort
and spin o↵ decisions made by private agents may not be socially e cient. In either
case, use of noncompete agreements may cause large e ciency losses ex post if spin
o↵ value turns out to be quite large but agents are prohibited from spinning o↵. This
loss is exacerbated by the ine cient e↵ort exertion when agents recoup only a portion
of the value of production. Furthermore, if there are positive externalities associated
with agents’ e↵ort levels, encouraging greater e↵ort is achievable by prohibiting use
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of noncompete agreements.
Future work may seek to incorporate models of e↵ort exertion with other models
describing the costs and benefits of noncompete agreements. Empirical analysis of the
mechanism described in this paper requires a method for assessing e↵ort, which may
be possible in some industries or occupations. Finally, further work describing when
noncompete agreements are socially e cient or ine cient, compared with when they
are used in practice, could go far in informing policy debates surrounding noncompete
agreements.
95
Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Main Tables and Figures
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Figure A·1: How Access to a Line of Credit Moderates the E↵ect of
Labor Supply Shifts on NCA Use
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The figure shows the average predicted probability that employers with
and without a line of credit had their most recent hire sign an NCA, for
di↵erent values of the number of applicants received for the position. The
predicted probabilities are generated from the regression corresponding
to Column 3 in Table A.6. The range shown for Number of Applicants
across the x-axis is 1 to 15, which are the 10th and 90th percentiles in
our sample, respectively.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
n mean sd median min max
Last Hire Signed NCA 218 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
Ever used NCA 218 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
Num stylists working in salon 218 7.13 8.79 4.00 0.00 52.00
Salon 2014 annual revenue, 000s 218 379.00 390.53 250.00 25.00 1500.00
% of stylists hired out of school, bin avg 218 42.33 36.65 32.69 5.00 95.00
Appointment only 218 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Years in beauty industry 218 27.39 13.29 27.00 1.00 59.00
Emp-based salon 218 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Bishara State NCA score, standardized 218 0.62 0.33 0.76 0.07 1.00
Line of Credit 218 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
# applicants for last vacancy 195 6.79 9.37 4.00 0.00 60.00
# applicants fewer than usual 218 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00
# applicants same as usual 218 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
# applicants more than usual 218 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00
Num beauty salons in county, 2012 218 386.68 498.22 183.50 1.00 1762.00
Revenue, Number of Applicants, and Number of Salons in County topcoded at 99th percentile.
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Table A.2: The Relationship Between Shifts in Labor Supply and
NCA Use
(1) (2) (3)
DV=last hire signed NCA
# applicants for last vacancy 0.012 0.0097 0.0082
(0.0038)***(0.0037)*** (0.0034)**
Bishara State NCA score, standardized 0.31 0.27 0.16
(0.087)*** (0.10)*** (0.091)*
Emp-based salon 0.17 0.053
(0.071)** (0.061)
% of stylists hired out of school, bin avg 0.0011 0.00034
(0.00095) (0.00074)
Num stylists working in salon -0.0024 -0.0049
(0.0047) (0.0042)
Age of owner -0.0031 -0.0061
(0.0033) (0.0027)**
Num beauty salons in county, 2012, 000s -0.024 0.0069
(0.070) (0.050)
Used NCAs prior to most recent hire 0.59
(0.073)***
Constant 0.029 0.12 0.28
(0.059) (0.19) (0.16)*
Observations 195 195 195
R2 0.099 0.148 0.418
Mean Dep Var 0.303 0.303 0.303
Bishara Score Y Y Y
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the most recently hired
stylist signed a NCA.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s enforceability of
NCAs.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05,
*P<.1
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Table A.3: The E↵ect of the Local Unemployment Rate on NCA
Use
(1) (2) (3)
DV = last hire signed NCA
Local Unemployment Rate 2012 0.014
(0.015)
Change in local Unemployment Rate 2006-2012 0.041 0.040
(0.022)* (0.024)*
Used NCAs in 2006 or earlier 0.46
(0.11)***
Observations 218 218 202
R2 0.105 0.117 0.242
Mean Dep Var 0.298 0.298 0.287
Bishara Score Y Y Y
Other Controls Y Y Y
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the most recently hired stylist
signed a NCA. In Column 3, the sample is restricted to owners who reported
being in the beauty industry since 2006.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon’s stylists hired directly out of
school, a dummy for employment-based salons, the owner’s age, the number
of stylists working in the salon, and the number of salons in a respondent’s
county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs clustered by county in parentheses.
***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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Table A.4: The Relationship Between The Minimum Wage and NCA
Use
(1) (2) (3)
DV = has ever used NCA
Minimum Cash Wage in 2014 0.030 0.050 0.032
(0.013)** (0.015)***(0.021)
Emp-based salon=1 ⇥ Minimum Cash Wage in 2014 0.057
(0.026)**
Observations 218 218 218
R2 0.044 0.141 0.229
Mean Dep Var 0.385 0.385 0.385
Bishara Score Y Y Y
Other Controls N Y Y
Emp-based salon is a dummy if the salon hires stylists as employees, as opposed
to independent contractors.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon’s stylists hired directly out of school,
a dummy for employment-based salons, the owner’s age, the number of stylists
working in the salon, and the number of salons in a respondent’s county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs clustered by state in parentheses.
***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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Table A.5: The Relationship Between NCA Use and the Investment
Holdup Problem
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcomes related to investment in client attraction
Social Web- Deal Email Other Trains
Media site sites Promotions Marketing workers
Ever used NCA -0.036 0.059 0.11 0.11 0.081 0.11
(0.057) (0.062) (0.052)** (0.066) (0.069) (0.043)**
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218
R2 0.110 0.154 0.063 0.207 0.052 0.301
Mean Dep Var 0.807 0.720 0.115 0.583 0.362 0.798
Bishara Score Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
The dependent variable in each column is a dummy for whether the employer
indicated using the corresponding tool. Columns 1-5 are tools to attract clients,
and Column 6 is a simple sum of the responses from Columns 1-5.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon’s stylists hired directly out of school,
a dummy for employment-based salons, the owner’s age, the number of stylists
working in the salon, and the number of salons in a respondent’s county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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A.2 Appendix Tables and Figures
Table A.7: State Tabulation
State Number State Number
AL 5 MT 1
AZ 3 NC 3
CA 54 NE 1
CO 5 NH 1
CT 4 NJ 5
DC 1 NM 1
FL 15 NV 1
GA 3 NY 9
IA 3 OH 5
IL 19 OK 1
IN 7 OR 2
KS 2 PA 10
KY 2 RI 1
LA 2 SC 1
MA 4 SD 1
MD 5 TN 2
ME 2 TX 9
MI 3 VA 5
MN 4 WA 3
MO 6 WI 7
Total 218
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Table A.8: The Relationship Between Within-
Owner Shifts in Labor Supply and Within-Owner
Changes in NCA Use
(1) (2)
DV=change in NCA use
# applicants more than usual 0.12 0.12
(0.086) (0.096)
# applicants fewer than usual -0.013 0.013
(0.067) (0.067)
Observations 195 195
R2 0.008 0.093
Mean Dep Var 0.036 0.036
Bishara Score Y Y
Other Controls N Y
The dependent variable is the di↵erence between a
dummy indicating whether an owner had its most re-
cently hired stylist sign an NCA, and a dummy indicating
whether the owner reported using NCAs prior to its most
recent hire.
Number of applicants more (fewer) is a dummy if the
number of applicants the owner received for its most re-
cent vacancy was more (fewer) than it received for similar
vacancies in the past.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s
enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon’s stylists
hired directly out of school, a dummy for employment-
based salons, the owner’s age, the number of stylists work-
ing in the salon, and the number of salons in a respon-
dent’s county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses.
***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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Table A.9: The Relationship Between The MinimumWage and NCA Use At Time
Of Most Recent Hire
(1) (2) (3)
DV = last hire signed NCA
Minimum Cash Wage in year of last hire 0.029 0.038 0.027
(0.012)** (0.014)***(0.019)
Emp-based salon=1 ⇥ Minimum Cash Wage in year of last hire 0.036
(0.034)
Observations 218 218 218
R2 0.047 0.124 0.166
Mean Dep Var 0.298 0.298 0.298
Bishara Score Y Y Y
Other Controls N Y Y
Emp-based salon is a dummy if the salon hires stylists as employees, as opposed to independent
contractors.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon’s stylists hired directly out of school, a dummy
for employment-based salons, the owner’s age, the number of stylists working in the salon, and
the number of salons in a respondent’s county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs clustered by state in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05,
*P<.1
106
T
a
b
le
A
.1
0
:
T
h
e
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
E
↵
ec
t
of
th
e
M
in
im
u
m
W
ag
e
an
d
L
ab
or
S
u
p
p
ly
on
N
C
A
U
se
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
D
V
=
la
st
h
ir
e
si
gn
ed
N
C
A
E
m
p
-b
as
ed
sa
lo
n
s
N
ot
em
p
-b
as
ed
sa
lo
n
s
#
ap
p
li
ca
nt
s
fo
r
la
st
va
ca
n
cy
0.
01
4
-0
.0
01
00
0.
00
92
0.
00
82
(0
.0
03
9)
**
*(
0.
01
3)
(0
.0
08
2)
(0
.0
17
)
M
in
im
u
m
C
as
h
W
ag
e
in
20
14
0.
06
4
0.
04
6
0.
02
5
0.
02
4
(0
.0
24
)*
**
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
23
)
#
ap
p
li
ca
nt
s
fo
r
la
st
va
ca
n
cy
⇥
M
in
im
u
m
C
as
h
W
ag
e
in
20
14
0.
00
20
0.
00
02
2
(0
.0
01
6)
(0
.0
03
4)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
10
0
10
0
95
95
R
2
0.
18
0
0.
19
2
0.
15
6
0.
15
6
M
ea
n
D
ep
V
ar
0.
41
0
0.
41
0
0.
18
9
0.
18
9
B
is
h
ar
a
S
co
re
Y
Y
Y
Y
O
th
er
C
on
tr
ol
s
Y
Y
Y
Y
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
eq
u
al
to
1
if
th
e
m
os
t
re
ce
nt
ly
h
ir
ed
st
yl
is
t
si
gn
ed
a
N
C
A
.
In
co
lu
m
n
s
1-
2
th
e
sa
m
p
le
is
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
sa
lo
n
s
w
h
ic
h
ar
e
em
p
lo
ym
en
t-
b
as
ed
,
an
d
in
co
lu
m
n
s
3-
4
th
e
sa
m
p
le
is
n
on
-
em
p
lo
ym
en
t-
b
as
ed
sa
lo
n
s.
B
is
h
ar
a
sc
or
e
is
a
st
an
d
ar
d
iz
ed
m
ea
su
re
of
ea
ch
st
at
e’
s
en
fo
rc
ea
b
il
it
y
of
N
C
A
s.
O
th
er
co
nt
ro
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
th
e
p
er
ce
nt
of
a
sa
lo
n
’s
st
yl
is
ts
h
ir
ed
d
ir
ec
tl
y
ou
t
of
sc
h
oo
l,
a
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
em
p
lo
ym
en
t-
b
as
ed
sa
lo
n
s,
th
e
ow
n
er
’s
ag
e,
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
st
yl
is
ts
w
or
ki
n
g
in
th
e
sa
lo
n
,
an
d
th
e
nu
m
b
er
of
sa
lo
n
s
in
a
re
sp
on
d
en
t’
s
co
u
nt
y.
L
in
ea
r
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
M
od
el
.
R
ob
u
st
S
E
s
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
**
*P
<
.0
1.
,
**
P
<
.0
5,
*P
<
.1
107
Table A.11: The Correlation Between Employers’ Access to a Line of Credit or
Banking Relationship and Investment in Client Attraction and Worker Training
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outcomes related to investment in client attraction
Social Web- Deal Email Other Sum of Trains
Media site sites Promotions Marketing marketing workers
Line of Credit 0.12 0.10 0.095 0.21 0.15 0.68 0.084
(0.051)** (0.060)* (0.047)** (0.063)*** (0.066)** (0.17)*** (0.049)*
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 218
R2 0.113 0.131 0.037 0.221 0.048 0.220 0.285
Mean Dep Var 0.807 0.720 0.115 0.583 0.362 2.587 0.798
Bishara Score Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
The dependent variable in each column is a dummy for whether the employer indicated using
the corresponding tool. Columns 1-5 are tools to attract clients, and Column 6 is a simple sum
of the responses from Columns 1-5.
Bishara score is a standardized measure of each state’s enforceability of NCAs.
Other controls include the percent of a salon’s stylists hired directly out of school, a dummy
for employment-based salons, the number of years the owner has been in the beauty industry,
and the number of salons in a respondent’s county.
Linear Probability Model. Robust SEs in parentheses. ***P<.01., **P<.05, *P<.1
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A.3 The Theoretical Impact of Changes in the Minimum
Wage on NCA Use
Suppose that utility transferability and the employee’s outside option are both func-
tions of the minimum wage, m: l(m) and ⇡E(m). We assume that l0(m) > 0: in-
creases in the minimum wage unambiguously decrease monetary utility transferabil-
ity. When B < C, the condition that ensures that equilibrium contracts have A = 1
( (µE)P   ⇡R < l(m)) is not a function of ⇡E(m). Since l0(m) > 0 by assumption,
increases in m allow this condition to be satisfied more easily: the willingness to pay
of RµE is more easily bound by l. Thus, increases in the minimum wage may only
increase NCA use through this channel, which we call the Bindingness E↵ect (BE).
Changes in m also a↵ect Assumption 2. If an increase in m causes a decrease in
⇡E(m), the assumption will continue to hold unambigiously if m increases. However,
if an increase in m causes an increase in ⇡E(m) (such as, for example, if the em-
ployee may easily find a job in another industry that pays the minimum wage), the
assumption may be violated if the corresponding increase in productivity of ıˆ(l(m))
is not large enough. We call these two competing e↵ects the Outside Option E↵ect
and the Transferability E↵ect, respectively. A su cient condition for increases in
the minimum wage not to decrease NCA use is that the Transferability E↵ect (TE)
dominates the Outside Option E↵ect (OOE):
Proposition A.3.1. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which B < C and
A = 1 in all contracts when the minimum wage is m. If the minimum wage increases
from m to m˜, in the new equilibrium, A = 1 in all contracts if the TE dominates the
OOE: l(m˜)  l(m)   ⇡E(m˜)  ⇡E(m).
Proof. By Proposition 1.2.1, µE > ıˆ(l(m)), since the equilibrium under m has A = 1
in all contracts. Since l0(m) > 0 and m˜ > m, l(m˜) > l(m), and therefore ıˆ(l(m˜)) <
ıˆ(l(m)). So, µE > ıˆ(l(m˜)). Thus, if Assumption 2 is satisfied under m˜ when the TE
dominates the OOE, the equilibrium will have A = 1 in all contracts.
Assumption 2 under m states that  (ˆı(l(m)))P +B   ⇡R > ⇡E(m) + C, which is
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equivalent to l(m)+B > ⇡E(m)+C by the definition of ıˆ(l(m)). Adding l(m˜)  l(m)
to the left hand side and adding ⇡E(m˜)  ⇡E(m) to the right hand side preserves the
inequality, since the TE dominates the OOE. Reducing, we are left with
l(m˜) + B > ⇡E(m˜)  C
 (ˆı(l(m˜))) + B   ⇡R > ⇡E(m˜)  C,
which is Assumption 2 under m˜. Therefore, all contracts have A = 1 in equilibrium
under m˜.
The interpretation of Proposition A.3.1 is straightforward. As long as a one dollar
increase in the minimum wage does not increase an employee’s outside option by
more than one dollar, NCA use will not decrease. If NCAs were not used prior to
an increase, they may be used after if the conditions of Proposition 1.2.1 become
satisfied. Assumption 2 may become satisfied if the TE outweighs the OOE, or the
BE may cause the inequality  (µE)  ⇡R < l(m) to hold.
A.4 Proofs
Proposition 1.2.1
Proof. Assuming that B < C, I will show that when µE < ıˆ(l), all firms’ equilibrium
contracts have A = 0, and if µE > ıˆ(l), all firms’ equilibrium contracts have A = 1.
When µE < ıˆ(l), the intersection of D(i) and S(i) occurs at i⇤0 = µE (since
D(i) > S(i) 8i < ıˆ(l) by Assumption 2). Since µE < ıˆ(l), the optimal contract for
the marginal firm is {w⇤0 ⌘  (µE) ⇡R, 0}. No Ri for i > µE is willing to form a firm,
and all Ri with i < µE are willing to form firms under that contract, since  (·) is
decreasing. Furthermore, the optimal contract for each firm with i < µE has A = 0.
Therefore, no firm will deviate from the marginal firm’s contract, all E are employed
receiving the same surplus, and no unmatched R can o↵er a better contract to an E.
So, an equilibrium in which A = 0 in all contracts exists when µE < ıˆ(l). Since the
optimal contract for all i  i⇤0 has A = 0, equilibria with A = 1 in any contract do
not exist.
110
When µR > µE > ıˆ(l), the intersection of D(i) and S(i) occurs at i⇤1 > ıˆ(l): if
D(µE) > S(µE), then i⇤1 = µE (all E are able to form firms). If D(µE) < S(µE),
then i⇤1 solves  (i
⇤
1)P + B   ⇡R = ⇡E + C (which solution exists by Assumption 2).
Since i⇤1 > ıˆ(l), the marginal firm’s contract is {w⇤1 ⌘  (i⇤1)P + B   ⇡R, 1}. For any
i 2 (ˆı(l), µE], firm i’s optimal contract has A = 1, and competition drives the wage
to w⇤1. However, for i  ıˆ(l), firm i’s optimal contract has A = 0. Consider the most
profitable contract for such a firm with A = 0: {l, 0}. That contract yields surplus
to Ri equal to  (i)P   l. The marginal firm’s contract yields surplus to Ri equal to
 (i)P   ( (i⇤1)P +B   ⇡R) + B. Ri prefers the contract {l, 0} whenever:
 (i)P   l >  (i)P   ( (i⇤1)P +B   ⇡R) + B
 (i⇤1)P   ⇡R > l.
However, l =  (ˆı(l))P   ⇡R >  (i⇤1)P   ⇡R, since i⇤1 > ıˆ(l). Therefore, there does
not exist a contract with A = 0 that any Ri prefers to {w⇤1, 1}, and competition
ensures that all firms use that contract. So, all equilibrium contracts have A = 1
when µR > µE > ıˆ(l).
Finally, when µE > µR, the logic of the preceding paragraph holds; however,
the wage determined by the intersection of D(i) and S(i) may be lower than l if
⇡E + C <  P + B   ⇡R < l. In that case, the equilibrium market contract is {l, 1},
and the proof is nearly identical.
Lemma 2.3.1
Proof. I will show that, in any equilibrium in which WUt+1 >
⇧
1   , the contract {w, 0}
is Pareto optimal for a newly formed firm at time t, and the contract {w, 1} is Pareto
optimal if and only if w    (1  s)mw < l.
I first show that any contract {w, 0} is Pareto optimal.
Consider an arbitrary deviation contract {w0, A0}. If A0 = 0, any increase from w
to w0 decreases R’s payo↵ by exactly the amount of the increase, and any decrease
from w to w0 decreases E’s payo↵ by exactly the amount of the decrease. Thus, no
contract {w0, 0} may be a profitable deviation contract.
Now, consider the deviation contract {w0, 1}. It is a mutually beneficial deviation
contract if it is beneficial for each agent, which is true when:
w   w0 +  (1  s)(V Nt+1( )  V Ft+1( )) > 0, and
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w0   w +  
h
s(
⇧
1     W
U
t+1) + (1  s)(WNt+1  W Ft+1( ))
i
> 0.
Such a contract may only exist if
(1  s)
h
V Nt+1( ) +W
N
t+1   V Ft+1( ) W Ft+1
i
> s
h
WUt+1  
⇧
1   
i
.
The continuation payo↵s following period t+1 are identical regardless of whether
At = 0 or At = 1 (sV Ut+2( ) + (1   s)V Ft+2( ) for E and sWUt+2 + (1   s)W Ft+2 for E).
Furthermore, the joint period payo↵ at t + 1 is also the same for the two contracts:
Pt+1    . Therefore, V Nt+1( ) +WNt+1   V Ft+1( )  W Ft+1 = 0. Since WUt+1 > ⇧1   by
assumption, there does not exist a contract {w0, p0} that is a mutually profitable
deviation, and {w, 0} is Pareto optimal.
Next, I show that the contract {w, 1} is Pareto optimal if w    (1   s)mw <
l. Again, since increases or decreases in w are simply transfers between agents, a
change in the wage alone is not enough to generate a Pareto improvement on {w, 1}.
Therefore, consider an arbitrary contract {w0, 0} where w0 > l. Suppose, for the sake
of contradiction, that {w0, 0} Pareto dominates {w, 1}.
Since {w0, 0} improves R’s payo↵, it must be the case that:
Pt   w0     +  
h
sV Ut+1 + (1  s)V Ft+1
i
  Pt   w     +  
h
sV Ut+1 + (1  s)V Nt+1
i
w0 < w    (1  s)(V Nt+1   V Ft+1)
Since V Nt+1   V Ft+1 = mw, w0 < w    (1   s)mw. However, by assumption, w  
 (1   s)mw < l, so w0 < l. This is not an allowable contract, and is therefore a
contradiction, so there exists no profitable deviation contract for R. Thus, {w, 1} is
Pareto optimal if w    (1  s)mw < l.
I now show that if {w, 1} is Pareto optimal, then w   (1 s)mw < l. Suppose for
the sake of contradiction that w   (1  s)mw > l. Then, the contract {w0, 0}, where
w0 = w    (1   s)mw is both allowable and generates equal value for R. E prefers
{w0, 0} if:
(w    (1  s)mw) +  
h
sWUt+1 + (1  s)W Ft+1
i
> w +  
h
s
⇧
1    + (1  s)W
N
t+1
i
s
⇣
WUt+1  
⇧
1   
⌘
+ (1  s)(W Ft+1  WNt+1) > (1  s)mw
112
s
⇣
WUt+1  
⇧
1   
⌘
> 0,
where the last line follows because W Ft+1  WNt+1 = mw. By assumption, WUt+1 > ⇧1   ,
which contradicts Pareto optimality of {w, 1}. Therefore, if {w, 1} is Pareto optimal,
then w    (1  s)mw < l.
Proposition 2.4.1
Proof. I will show that when l is low, a steady state equilibrium exists in which A = 0
in all market contracts.
The equilibrium values are given by the solution to the linear system:
 WU   c =  ⇧
1   
V U =0
where
V U = P (Q)  w     +  (sV U + (1  s)V F )
V F = P (Q) +mp   w  mw     +  (sV U + (1  s)V F )
WU = w +  (sWU + (1  s)W F )
W F = w +mw +  (sWU + (1  s)W F )
Q = µU + µF
µU = sQ
µF = (1  s)Q
µ¯ = 0
for   =  H if Q > pµR or   =  L if Q < pµR1.
Proposition 2.4.2
Proof. I will show that 9lSS and ⌦SS such that, when l > lSS and ⌦   ⌦SS, a steady
state equilibrium exists in which A = 1 in all market contracts.
1Note that, for steady states with or without NCAs, neither solution may exist, in which case
the wage would be on the vertical portion of labor demand and Q = pµR.
113
The equilibrium values are given by the solution to the following linear system:
 WU   c =  ⇧
1   
V U =0
where
V U = P (Q)  w     +  (sV U + (1  s)V N)
V F = P (Q) +mp   w  mw     +  (sV U + (1  s)V F )
V N = P (Q) +mp   w     +  (sV U + (1  s)V F )
WU = w +  (s
⇧
1    + (1  s)W
N)
W F = w +mw +  (sWU + (1  s)W F )
WN = w +  (sWU + (1  s)W F )
Q = µU + µF + µN
µU = µ¯+ s(µF + µN)
µF = (1  s)(µF + µN)
µN = (1  s)µU
µ¯ = sµU
for   =  H if Q > pµR or   =  L if Q < pµR.
In order for the above to be an equilibrium, the market clearing wage with A = 0
must be bound by l. This market clearing wage is given by the solution to
wmc = P (Q)    +  (sV U + (1  s)V F )
In this case, the solution is
wmc = ⇧+  (1 +  (1  s))mw + c
 
(1   (1  s)(1 +  s)) ⌘ lSS.
Additionally, µ¯ must not be bound by ⌦. Here:
µ¯ =
s2
 ⇢(Pint +  (1  s)m
p       ⇧  c
 
(1   (1  s)(1 +  s)) ⌘ ⌦SS.
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Proposition 2.4.3
Proof. I will show that, when Assumptions 5 and 6 are satisfied, there exist l(⌦),
l(⌦), ⌦, and ⌦ such that, whenever l(⌦) < l < l(⌦) and ⌦ < ⌦ < ⌦, a 2-cyclical
equilibrium exists. In that 2-cyclical equilibrium, A = 1 in all previously unmatched
firms’ contracts in periods t+2n+1, and A = 0 in all such contracts in periods t+2n,
for n 2 N.
A vector {w0, w1, µ¯} induces a 2-cyclical equilibrium as described in Section 2.4.3
if it satisfies single period equilibrium conditions in even and odd periods, the odd
period equality entry condition for E, even period inequality entry conditions for E,
wD1 (µ
U
E,1) < l < w
D
0 (µ
U
E,0), and the laws of motion guarantee that labor supply replen-
ishment occurs over two periods. The first three conditions generate the following
system of equations:
w⇤0 = w
D
0 (µ
U
E,0) (A.1)
w⇤1 = w
D
1 (µ
U
E,1) (A.2)
 WU1   cE =
 
1   ⇧ (A.3)
The final conditions are:
wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1) < l
wˆD0 (µ
U
E,0) > l
µ¯E,0  ⌦  sµUE,1
 WU0   cE  
 
1   ⇧
Solution to Equations A.1 - A.3
First, I show that there exists a solution, {w⇤0, w⇤1, µ¯}, to the system defined by
Equations A.1 - A.3. Equations A.1 and A.2 reduce to
w⇤0 = P (Q0)   L +  (1  s)(mp  mw(1 +  (1  s))) (A.4)
w⇤1 = P (Q1)  (1 +  (1  s)) H +  (1  s)(P (Q0)  w⇤0 (A.5)
+ (1 +  (1  s))(mp    (1  s)mw)) (A.6)
Since P (Q0), P (Q1), WU0 , and W
U
1 are linear in µ¯, w0, and w1, the system is linear in
those parameters, and therefore has a solution for almost all values of the exogenous
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parameters.
Proof that wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1) < l < w0 = wˆ
D
0 (µ
U
E,0)
Next, I show that wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1) < l < w0 = wˆ
D
0 (µ
U
E,0). Since all relevant equations
are independent of l, as long as w0 > wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1), there exists a wage constraint, l, that
induces A0 = 0 and A1 = 1 whenever l 2 (wˆD1 (µUE,1), w0).
In the posited equilibrium, wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1) = P (Q1)  H+ (1 s)(V F0 ( H) V U0 ( H)).
So:
w0   wˆD1 (µUE,1) =
P (Q0)  P (Q1) +  H    L +  (1  s)(V F1 ( L)  V U1 ( L) + V U0 ( H)  V F0 ( H))
Substituting based on the value function reductions in Section 2.4.3:
V F1 ( L)  V U1 ( L) = mp  mw(1 +  (1  s))
V F0 ( H) V U0 ( H) = P (Q0) w0  H+(1+ (1 s))mp (1+ (1 s)+ 2(1 s)2)mw
Substituting and reducing, w0   wˆD1 (µUE,1) > 0 whenever
P (Q0)  P (Q1) +  H    L    2(1  s)2mw) > 0,
which is true by Assumption 5. Note that the lower and upper bounds for l, given
by wˆD1 (µ
U
E,1) and wˆ
D
0 (µ
U
E,0), are functions of ⌦ via the goods market prices.
Proof that 0 < µ¯⇤  ⌦  sµUE,1
Next, I show that 9⌦ and ⌦ such that, if ⌦ 2 [⌦,⌦], then 0 < µ¯  ⌦. In order
to do so, let µ¯(⌦) represent the value of µ¯,that solves Equations A.1 - A.3, taken as
a function of the exogenous parameter ⌦. I show that µ¯0(⌦) < 0 and that µ¯(0) > 0.
These two conditions ensure that the graph of µ¯ as a function of ⌦ crosses the positive
part of the 45 degree line. Therefore, since µ¯⇤ is continuous with respect to ⌦, µ¯⇤  ⌦
and µ¯⇤ > 0 for ⌦ 2 [⌦,⌦), where ⌦ solves µ¯(⌦) = ⌦ and ⌦ solves µ¯(⌦) = 0.
Di↵erentiating µ¯(⌦) yields:
µ¯0(⌦) =   1 +  (1  s)(1   s)
1 +  (1  s)3    2(1  s)s
Since { , s} 2 [0, 1]⇥ [0, 1], µ¯0(⌦) < 0.
To show that µ¯(0) > 0, consider the case if entry in odd periods were zero and µ¯ =
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0. Then, Q0 = Q1 = 0, and P (Q0) = P (Q1) = Pint. An atomic E entering the market
would capture all surplus, therefore earning more than Pint    L or Pint    L +mP
in each round. Since Pint    L > ⇧, entry is profitable, and therefore, µ¯(0) > 0 if
⌦ = 0. Since µ¯(0) > 0, µ¯0(⌦) < 1, and µ¯(⌦) is continuous, 9{⌦,⌦} (where ⌦ solves
µ¯⇤(⌦) = ⌦ and ⌦ solves µ¯⇤(⌦) = 0) such that 0 < µ¯  ⌦ for all ⌦ 2 [⌦,⌦).
Note that, since µ1E =
⌦+µ¯
s , the measure of separating agents is ⌦ + µ¯. Since
µ¯ > 0, the market is unable to replenish in one period in the posited equilibrium.
Proof that  WU0   cE    1  ⇧
I prove this by contradiction. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that  WU0  
cE   1  ⇧. Since  WU1   cE =  1  ⇧, WU0  WU1 . Therefore, using the definitions of
the value functions in Section 2.4.3 and Equation A.3:
WU1  WU0 = w⇤1   w⇤0   scE +  (1  s)(WN0  W F1 )   0 (A.7)
Using the di↵erences
WN0  W F1 = w⇤0   w⇤1  mw +  
⇥
s(WU1  WU0 ) + (1  s)(W F1  W F0 )
⇤
and
W F1  W F0 =
w⇤1   w⇤0 +  s(WU0  WU1 )
1 +  (1  s)
, I reduce Inequality A.7 to:
1
1 +  (1  s)(1   s) [w
⇤
1   w⇤0    (1 +  (1  s))(1  s)mw   s(1 +  (1  s))cE]   0
(A.8)
An expression for w⇤1   w⇤0 is found by Substituting for w⇤0 in Equation A.6 using
Equation A.4, and subsequently subtracting A.4 from A.6. Substituting this into
Inequality A.8 and simplifying yields:
1
1 +  (1  s)(1   s)
h
P (Q1)  P (Q0)
+ (1 +  (1  s)( L    H)  s(1 +  (1  s))cE   0
i
Because all coe cients are positive, this implies that either P (Q1) > P (Q0),
 L >  H , or cE < 0 (or all three hold with equality). Since each of these is false, the
assumption that  WU0   cE   1  ⇧ is contradicted, and the desired result is proven.
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Proposition 2.5.1
Proof. I will show that dSDIFFSSd⇣ > 0 for ⇣ 2 { H ,⇧, s}, and dSDIFFSSd⇣ < 0 for
⇣ 2 {mp, Pint}.
Recall the equilibrium value of Qˆ:
Qˆ =
 ( H + ⇧  Pint    mp(1  s)) + c(1   (1  s)(1 +  s))
 ⇢
For ⇣ 2 { H ,⇧}:
dSDIFFSS
d⇣
=
dQˆ
d⇣
( H + s
2c+ ⇧  P (Qˆ)  (1  s)mp) + Qˆ
It su ces to show that ( H + s2c + ⇧   P (Qˆ)   (1   s)mp)  0. This expression is
exactly the negative of the net per-firm surplus that accrues to E and R for R with
 H . Whenever firms with R whose marginal cost is  H exist, this quantity is negative.
Similarly:
dSDIFFSS
dmp
=
dQˆ
dmp
( H + s
2c+ ⇧  P (Qˆ)  (1  s)mp)  (1  s)Qˆ < 0,
since dQˆdmp > 0.
Finally:
dSDIFFSS
ds
=
dQˆ
ds
( H + s
2c+ ⇧  P (Qˆ)  (1  s)mp) + (Qˆ Qx)mp + 2scQˆ > 0,
since dQˆds =
 mp+(1  (1 2s))c
⇢ < 0.
Proposition 2.5.2
Proof. I will show that dSDIFFcyc1d⇣ > 0 for ⇣ 2 { H ,⇧}, and dSDIFFcyc1d⇣ < 0 for
⇣ 2 {mp, Pint}.
Noting that, for both t = 0 and t = 1, dQˆtd⇣ < 0 for ⇣ 2 { H ,⇧} and > 0 for
⇣ 2 {mp, Pint}, this proof follows similar logic to that of Proposition 2.5.1. For
⇣ 2 { H ,⇧}:
dSDIFFcyc1
d⇣
=
dQˆ1
d⇣
( H + ⇧  P (Q1))  (1  s)mpdQˆ0
d⇣
+ Qˆ1 > 0.
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For ⇣ = mp:
dSDIFFcyc1
d⇣
=
dQˆ1
d⇣
( H + ⇧  P (Q1))  (1  s)mpdQˆ0
d⇣
  (1  s)Qˆ0 < 0.
And, for ⇣ = Pint:
dSDIFFcyc1
d⇣
=
dQˆ1
d⇣
( H + ⇧  P (Q1))  (1  s)mpdQˆ0
d⇣
  1ˆ0 < 0.
Proposition 2.5.3
Proof. I will show that dSDIFFcyc0d⇣ > 0 for ⇣ 2 { H ,⇧}, and dSDIFFcyc0d⇣ < 0 for
⇣ 2 {mp, Pint}.
First, note that dQˆ0d⇣ =
1 s
s2
dµ¯
d⇣ and
dQˆ1
d⇣ =
s+(1 s)2
s2
dµ¯
d⇣ for all ⇣ of interest. Therefore,
when dm¯ud⇣ < 0 (as is true for ⇣ =  H and ⇧),
dQˆ0
d⇣ >
dQˆ1
d⇣ and when
dm¯u
d⇣ > 0 (as is true
for mp and Pint),
dQˆ0
d⇣ >
dQˆ1
d⇣ .
For ⇣ 2 { H ,⇧}:
dSDIFFcyc0
d⇣
=
dQˆ0
d⇣
( L + ⇧  P (Q0))  (1  s)mpdQˆ1
d⇣
+ c
dm¯u
d⇣
+ Qˆ0
>
dQˆ0
d⇣
( L + ⇧+
s2
1  sc  P (Q0)  (1  s)m
p) + Qˆ0 > 0,
since dQˆ0d⇣ =
1 s
s2
dµ¯
d⇣ and
dQˆ0
d⇣ >
dQˆ1
d⇣ .
Similarly, for ⇣ = mp:
dSDIFFcyc0
d⇣
<
dQˆ0
d⇣
( L + ⇧+
s2
1  sc  P (Q0)  (1  s)m
p)  (1  s)Qˆ0 < 0.
And, for ⇣ = Pint:
dSDIFFcyc0
d⇣
<
dQˆ0
d⇣
( L + ⇧+
s2
1  sc  P (Q0)  (1  s)m
p)  Qˆ0 < 0.
Proposition 3.3.1
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Proof. A contract with NCA = 1 restricts the planner’s choice of D and does not
change the level of social surplus associated with each choice of D. Therefore, it is
weakly dominated by a contract with NCA = 0.
Proposition 3.4.1
Proof. I will show that, under Assumption 7, if D⇤ = 0, then e⇤ > e⇤⇤.
By Assumption 7, the second order condition for Problem 3.5 must hold:  (1  
↵)⇡002(e
⇤⇤) < c00(e⇤⇤). Since ⇡2(·) and c(·) are continuous and e⇤⇤ is unique, this implies
that  (1   ↵)⇡02(e) > c0(e) 8e < e⇤⇤ and  (1   ↵)⇡02(e) < c0(e) 8e > e⇤⇤. Addition of
the positive constant  ↵V 0(e⇤) to the function  (1   ↵)⇡02(e) causes that function’s
crossing with c0(e) to therefore occur at a greater value of e. By definition, this value
is e⇤ when D⇤ = 0, so e⇤ > e⇤⇤.
Proposition 3.4.2
Proof. I will show that, under Assumption 7, if D⇤ = 1, then e⇤ > e⇤⇤ if 9e in the
closed interval whose endpoints are e⇤ and e⇤⇤ such that V 0(e) > (1  ↵)⇡02(e).
Let e˜ be the value of e such that V 0(e˜) > (1  ↵)⇡02(e˜).
Suppose, for the sake of reaching a contradiction, that e⇤⇤ > e⇤. Then, by logic
explained in the proof of Proposition 3.4.1,  (1   ↵)⇡02(e) > c0(e) 8e < e⇤⇤ and
 V 0(e) < c0(e) 8e > e⇤. Since e⇤ < e⇤⇤, e˜ 2 [e⇤, e⇤⇤]. Therefore:
 (1  ↵)⇡02(e˜) > c0(e˜) >  V 0(e˜)(1  ↵)⇡02(e˜) > V 0(e˜)
This contradicts the assumption that V 0(e˜) > (1  ↵)⇡02(e˜). Therefore, e⇤ > e⇤⇤.
Proposition 3.4.3
Proof. I will show that, if D⇤ = 1, NCA = 1 uniquely maximizes surplus if and only
if  (⇡2(e⇤⇤)  V (e⇤1)  ⇡n) > c(e⇤⇤)  c(e⇤1). If D⇤ = 0, NCA = 1 uniquely maximizes
surplus if and only if  (⇡2(e⇤⇤)  ⇡2(e⇤0)) > c(e⇤⇤)  c(e⇤0).
I find surplus maximizing contracts by identifying two contracts–one with NCA =
0 and one with NCA = 1–that yield identical utility to P . I then compare the values
of the two contracts to A.
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Consider two initial contracts, {wF , 0} and {wN , 1}. When D⇤ = 1, these con-
tracts yield identical expected utility to P when:
 ⇡n   wF =  (⇡2(e⇤⇤)  E[w2(0, e⇤⇤, ")]
wF = wN    ↵(⇡2(e⇤⇤)  ⇡n   VA)
Substituting these wages into A’s expected utility and simplifying, A strictly
prefers a contract with NCA = 1 whenever  (⇡2(e⇤⇤)   V (e⇤1)   ⇡n) > c(e⇤⇤)   c(e⇤1)
and strictly prefers NCA = 0 when the inequality is reversed.
Similarly, when D⇤ = 0, {wF , 0} and {wN , 1} yield equal utility if wF = wN +
 ↵(⇡2(e⇤0)   ⇡2(e⇤⇤) + V (e⇤⇤)   V (e⇤0)). Substituting this into A’s expected utility
and simplifying, A strictly prefers a contract with NCA = 1 whenever  (⇡2(e⇤⇤)  
⇡2(e⇤0)) > c(e
⇤⇤)  c(e⇤0) and strictly prefers NCA = 0 when the inequality is reversed.
Proposition 3.5.1
Proof. I will show that, when DF = DN = D⇤ = 0, then, e⇤⇤ < e⇤ < e¯F0 = e¯
N if
V 0(e¯F0 ) < ⇡
0
2(e¯
F
0 ), and e
⇤⇤ < e¯F0 = e¯
N < e⇤ if V 0(e¯F0 ) > ⇡
0
2(e¯
F
0 ).
Proposition 3.4.1 establishes that e⇤ > e⇤⇤. By substitution of the definition of eP0 ,
the condition V 0(eP0 )) < ⇡
0
2(e
P
0 ) is equivalent to  ((1  ↵)⇡02(eP0 ) + ↵V 0(eP0 )) < c0(eP0 ).
When that condition holds, e⇤ < eP0 by Assumption 7 and continuity of the constituent
functions. The reverse is true when  ((1   ↵)⇡02(eP0 ) + ↵V 0(eP0 )) > c0(eP0 ) (i.e., when
V 0(eP0 ) > ⇡
0
2(e
P
0 )).
Proposition 3.5.2
Proof. I will show that, when NCA = 1, e↵ort in a decentralized equilibrium is never
first best (i.e., e⇤⇤ 6= e¯N). When NCA = 0, e↵ort in a decentralized equilibrium is
first best whenever any of the following are satisfied:
1. DF = D⇤ = 1;
2. ⇡02(e¯
F
0 ) = V
0(e¯F0 ) and D
F = 0; or
3. ⇡02(e¯
F
1 ) = V
0(e¯F1 ), D
F = 1, and D⇤ = 0.
Since DN 6= 1, e↵ort when NCA = 1 is given by eP0 and e⇤⇤0 . The equations that
define those e↵ort levels yield di↵erent solutions whenever pi02(e) > 0, and therefore
e↵ort is not first best in the decentralized equilibrium when NCA = 1.
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The equations that define eP1 and e
⇤
1 are identical (c
0(e) =  V 0(e)); thus, when
NCA = 0 and DF = D⇤ = 1, e⇤ is first best.
When DF = 0, e↵ort is defined by c0(eP0 ) =  ⇡
0
2(e
P
0 ). Since V
0(eP0 ) = ⇡
0
2(e
P
0 ),
c0(eP0 ) =  V
0(eP0 ). This equation defines e
⇤
0, so e
⇤
0 = e
P
0 . Similarly, c
0(eP0 ) =  (↵V
0(eP0 )+
(1  ↵)⇡02(eP0 )), which defines e⇤1, so e⇤1 = eP0 .
Similarly, when ⇡02(e
P
1 ) = V
0(eP1 ), the definition of e
P
1 may be rewritten as c
0(eP1 ) =
 (↵V 0(eP1 )+(1 ↵)⇡02(eP1 )), which also defines e⇤0. So, e⇤0 = eP1 . Therefore, in all listed
cases, e↵ort is first best.
Proposition 3.6.1
Proof. I will show that, if e¯F , e¯N , e⇤, and e⇤⇤ are unique and B0(e) < 0, then e⇤ >
e¯F > e¯N > e⇤⇤.
First, I show that e⇤ > eP0 . The function of e equated with c
0(e) to determine e⇤
lies above the analagous function for eP0 for a given e if
(1 G(B(e)))V 0(e) +G(B(e))((1  ↵)⇡02(e) + ↵V 0(e)) >
(1 G(B(e)))V 0(e) +G(B(e))⇡02(e),
which is true since B0(e) = ⇡02(e)  V 0(e) < 0. By uniqueness, e⇤ > eP0 .
Similarly, eP0 > e
P
1 since (1   G(B(e)))V 0(e) + G(B(e))⇡02(e) > ⇡02(e). Finally,
eP1 > e
⇤⇤ since ⇡02(e) > (1  ↵)⇡02(e).
Proposition 3.6.2
Proof. Let SiNCA(") represent ex post joint surplus achieved in the planner’s problem
(i = P ) and the decentralized equilibrium (i = D) for NCA = 0 and NCA = 1.
Suppose that c00(e) > 0, V 00(e) < 0, and ⇡002(e) < 0. I will show that, when " > B(e)
for e 2 {e¯F , e⇤}, SD0 (")  SD1 (") > SP0 (")  SP1 (").
First, I explicitly define SiNCA(") for values of " > max{B(eP0 ), B(e⇤)}:
SD0 (") =  c(e⇤) +  (V (e⇤) + "+ "c + ⇡n)
SD1 (") =  c(e⇤⇤) +  (⇡2(e⇤⇤) + "c)
SP0 (") =  c(eP0 ) +  (V (eP0 ) + "+ "c + ⇡n)
SP1 (") =  c(eP1 ) +  (⇡2(eP1 ) + "c)
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Note that, since " > max{B(eP0 ), B(e⇤)}, DF0 = D⇤ = 1: A spins o↵ at t = 2
when able.
Rearranging the desired inequality to SD0 (")   SP0 (") > SD1 (")   SP1 (") and can-
celling all instances of ", it may be written as:
 c(e⇤) +  (V (e⇤) + "+ ⇡n) + c(eP0 )   (V (eP0 ) + "+ ⇡n)
>  c(e⇤⇤) +  ⇡2(e⇤⇤) + c(eP1 )   ⇡2(eP1 ) (A.9)
Note that the right hand side is negative: eP1 maximizes c(e)    ⇡2(e) and e⇤⇤ does
not.
Now, consider the left hand side. Define eM as the value of e that maximizes
 c(e) +  V (e). Then, e⇤ always lies between eP0 and eM : if V 0(e) > ⇡02(e), eP0 <
e⇤ < eM (by the logic described in Proposition 3.6.1). This holds in reverse when
V 0(e) < ⇡02(e) by the same logic. Since  c(e)+ V (e) is concave (as V (e) is convex and
c(e) is concave) and eM is its maximizer, the fact that e⇤ is closer to eM implies that
 c(e⇤)+  V (e⇤) >  c(eP0 )+  V (eP0 ). Addition of the constant "+⇡n does not change
this. Therefore, the left hand side of Inequality A.9 is positive, and by extension, is
greater than the right hand side which has been shown to be negative. Therefore, the
proposition is proven.
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